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Abstract
Shortly after it was first introduced in 2006, differential privacy became the flagship data
privacy definition. Since then, numerous variants and extensions were proposed to adapt it to
different scenarios and attacker models. In this work, we propose a systematic taxonomy of
these variants and extensions. We list all data privacy definitions based on differential privacy,
and partition them into seven categories, depending on which aspect of the original definition
is modified.
These categories act like dimensions: variants from the same category cannot be combined, but
variants from different categories can be combined to form new definitions. We also establish
a partial ordering of relative strength between these notions by summarizing existing results.
Furthermore, we list which of these definitions satisfy some desirable properties, like compo-
sition, post-processing, and convexity by either providing a novel proof or collecting existing
ones.
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1 Introduction
What does it mean for data to be anonymized? Samarati and Sweeney discovered that remov-
ing explicit identifiers from dataset records was not enough to prevent information from being
re-identified [Sam01, Swe02], and they proposed the first definition of anonymization. This notion,
called k-anonymity, is a property of a dataset: each combination of re-identifying fields must be
present at least k times. In the following decade, further research showed that sensitive infor-
mation about individuals could still be leaked when releasing k-anonymous datasets, and many
variants and definitions were proposed, such as l-diversity [MGKV06], t-closeness [LLV07], and
n-confusion [ST12].
A common shortcoming of these approaches is that they defined anonymity as a property of the
dataset : without knowing how the dataset is generated, arbitrary information can be leaked. This
approach was changed with the introduction of differential privacy [DM05, Dwo06] (DP): rather
than being a property of the sanitized dataset, anonymity was instead defined as a property of the
process. It was inspired by Dalenius’ privacy goal that “Anything about an individual that can be
learned from the dataset can also be learned without access to the dataset” [Dal77], a goal similar
to one already used in probabilistic encryption [SM84].
Thanks to its useful properties, differential privacy quickly became the flagship of dta privacy
definitions. Many algorithms and statistical processes were changed to satisfy differential privacy
and were adopted by organizations like the US Census Bureau [AAG+10, GAP18], Google [EPK14],
Apple [Tea17], Microsoft [DKY17], LinkedIn [KT18], Uber [JNHS18], etc.
Since the original introduction of differential privacy, many variants and extensions have been
proposed to adapt it to different contexts or assumptions. These new definitions enable practitioners
to get privacy guarantees, even in cases that the original DP definition does not cover well. This
happens in a variety of scenarios: the noise mandated by DP can be too large and force the data
custodian to consider a weaker alternative, the risk model might be inappropriate for certain use
cases, or the context might require the data owner to make stronger statements on what information
the privacy mechanism can reveal.
Figure 1 shows the prevalence of this phenomenon: approximately 225 different notions1, in-
spired by DP, were defined in the last 15 years. As we show in Figure 1, this phenomenon does not
seem to slow down over time. These definitions can be extensions or variants of DP. An extension
encompasses the original DP notion as a special case, while a variant changes some aspect, typically
to weaken or strengthen the original definition.
With so many definitions, it is difficult for new practitioners to get an overview of this research
area. Many definitions have similar goals, so it is also challenging to understand which are appro-
priate to use in which context. These difficulties also affect experts: a number of definitions listed
in this work have been defined independently multiple times (often with identical meaning but
different names, or identical names but different meanings). Finallly, variants are often introduced
without a comparison to related notions.
This systematization of knowledge attempts to solve these problems. It is a taxonomy of variants
and extensions of DP, providing short explanations of the intuition, use cases and basic properties
of each. By categorizing these definitions, we attempt to simplify the understanding of existing
variants and extensions, and of the relations between them. We hope to make it easier for new
practitioners to understand whether their use case needs an alternative definition, and if so, which
existing notions are the most appropriate, and what their basic properties are.
1We count all the definitions which are presented as “new” in the papers introducing them.
3
Figure 1: Accumulated number of papers which are introducing new DP notions (line) and the
exact number of these definitions (bar).
Contributions and organization
We systematize the scientific literature on variants and extensions of differential privacy, and pro-
pose a unified and comprehensive taxonomy of these definitions. We define seven dimensions:
these are ways in which the original definition of DP can be modified or extended. We list vari-
ants and extensions that belong to each dimension, and we highlight representative definitions for
each. Whenever possible, we compare these definitions and establish a partial ordering between
the strengths of different notions. Furthermore, for each definition, we specify whether it satisfies
Kifer et al.’s privacy axioms [KL10, KL12], (post-processing and convexity), and whether they are
composable.
Our survey is organized as follows:
• In Section 2, we recall the original definition of DP and introduce our dimensions along
which DP can be modified. Moreover, we present the basic properties of DP, and define how
definitions can related to each other.
• In the following 7 sections (Sections 3 to 9), we introduce our dimensions, and list and compare
the corresponding definitions.
• In Section 10, we summarize the results from the previous sections into a table, showing the
corresponding properties with proofs, and list the known relations.
• In Section 11 we detail the methodology and scope of this work and review the related liter-
ature.
• Finally, in 12 we conclude this work.
2 Differential Privacy
In this section we recap the original differential privacy definition with its basic properties, define
how definitions can related to each other and introduce our dimensions along which DP can be
modified.
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Let T denote an arbitrary set of possible records. We typically use t to denote the records
themselves. A dataset is a finite indexed family of records. We denote by D space of possible
datasets, individuals datasets are typically called D, D′, D1 or D2. The indices of a dataset are
typically called i and j, with D(i) referring to the i-th record of a dataset D. We denote by D−i
the dataset D whose i-th record has been removed.
Let O denote an arbitrary set of possible outputs; outputs are typically called O, and sets of
outputs called S. A mechanism is a randomized function which takes a dataset as input and returns
an output. Mechanisms are typically called M while M (D) is usually a random variable.
Probability distributions on T are called pi, probability distribution on D are called θ, and family
of probability distributions on D are called Θ. Given some property φ, let M (D)|D∼θ,φ denote
the random variable corresponding to the output of M (D), when D is drawn from a distribution
θ conditioned on φ.
Table 1 summarizes the notations used throughout the paper.
Notation Description
T Set of possible records
t ∈ T A possible record
D = T ∗ Set of possible datasets (sequences of records)
D ∈ D Dataset (we also use D′, D1, D2, . . . )
D(i) i-th record of the dataset (i ≤ |D|)
D−i Dataset D, with its i-th record removed
O Set of possible outputs of privacy mechanisms
S ⊆ O Subset of possible outputs
O ∈ O Output of the privacy mechanism
M : D → O Privacy mechanism (probabilistic)
M (D) The distribution (or an instance thereof) of the outputs of M given input D
dD : D ×D → R+0 Distance function between datasets
φ ⊆ D Predicate on datasets
Φ Family of sensitive predicates on datasets
pi Probability distribution on T
B Set of possible background knowledges
B ∈ B Background knowledge (we also use Bˆ)
Θ Family of probability distributions on D, on D × B
θ ∈ Θ Probability distribution on D, on D × B
M (D)|D∼θ,φ Distribution of outputs of M given an input drawn from θ, conditioned on φ
Ω Probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine, called distinguisher
Table 1: Notations used in this paper.
2.1 The original version
The first DP mechanism, randomized response, was proposed in 1965 [War65], and data privacy
definitions that are a property of a mechanism and not of the output dataset were already proposed
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in as early as 2003 [EGS03]. However, DP and the related notion of ε-indistinguishability were first
formally defined in 2006 [Dwo06, DMNS06, DM05].
Definition 1 (ε-indistinguishability [DMNS06]). Two random variables A and B are ε-indistinguishable,
denoted A ≈ε B, if for all measurable sets X of possible events:
P [A ∈ X] ≤ eε · P [B ∈ X] and P [B ∈ X] ≤ eε · P [A ∈ X] .
Informally, A and B are ε-indistinguishable if their distributions are “close”. This notion origi-
nates from the cryptographic notion of indistinguishability [GM84]. A similar notion, (1, ε)-privacy,
was defined in [CM06], where (1 + ε) used in place of eε, and it was also called log-ratio distance
in [HMSS19].
The notion of ε-indistinguishability is then used to define differential privacy.
Definition 2 (ε-differential privacy [Dwo06]). A privacy mechanismM is ε-differential private (or
ε-DP) if for all datasets D1 and D2 that differ only in one record, M (D1) ≈εM (D2).
2.2 Dimensions
Variants and extensions of differential privacy modify the original definition in various ways. To
establish a comprehensive taxonomy, a natural approach is to partition them into categories, de-
pending on which aspect of the definition they change. Unfortunately, this approach fails for privacy
definitions, many of which modify several aspects at once, so it is impossible to have a categorization
such that every definition falls neatly into only one category.
The approach we take is to define dimensions along which the original definition can be modified.
Each variant or extension of DP can be seen as a point in a multidimensional space, where each
coordinate corresponds to one possible way of changing the definition along a particular dimension.
To make this representation possible, our dimensions need to satisfy two properties:
• Mutual compatibility: definitions that vary along different dimensions can be combined to
form a new, meaningful definition.
• Inner exclusivity: definitions in the same dimension cannot be combined to form a new,
meaningful definition (but they can be pairwise comparable).
In addition, each dimension should be motivatable: there should be an intuitive explanation
of what it means to modify DP along each dimension. Moreover, each possible choice within a
dimension should be similarly understandable, to allow new practitioners to determine quickly
which kind of definition they should use or study, depending on their use case.
We introduce our dimensions by reformulating the guarantee offered by DP, highlighting aspects
that have been modified by its variants or extensions. Each dimension is attributed a letter, and
we note the dimension letter corresponding to each highlight. This formulation considers the point
of view of an attacker, trying to find out some sensitive information about some input data using
the output of a mechanism.
An attacker with perfect background knowledge (B) and unbounded computation power
(C) is unable (R) to distinguish (F) anything about an individual (N), uniformly across
users (V) even in the worst-case scenario (Q).
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Dimension Description Typical motivations
Quantification of Privacy Loss How is the privacy loss Averaging risk, obtaining
quantified across outputs? better composition properties
Neighborhood Definition Which properties are protected Protecting specific values
from the attacker? or multiple individuals
Variation of Privacy Loss Can the privacy loss vary Modeling users with different
across inputs? privacy requirements
Background Knowledge How much prior knowledge Using mechanisms that add
does the attacker have? less or no noise to data
Formalism change Which formalism is used to describe Exploring other intuitive
the attacker’s knowledge gain? notions of privacy
Relativization of Knowledge Gain What is the knowledge gain Guaranteeing privacy for
relative to? correlated data
Computational Power How much computational Combining cryptography
power can the attacker use? techniques with DP
Table 2: The seven dimensions and their typical motivation.
This informal definition of DP with the seven highlighted aspects give us seven distinct dimen-
sions. We denote each one by a letter and summarize them in Table 2. Each is introduced in its
corresponding section.
Note that the interpretation of DP is subject to some debate. In [TSD20], authors summarize
this debate, and show that DP can be interpreted under two possible lenses: it can be seen as an
associative property, or as a causal property. The difference between the two interpretations is
particularly clear when one supposes that the input dataset is modeled as being generated by a
probability distribution.
• In the associative view, this probability distribution is conditioned upon the value of one
record. If the distribution has correlations, this change can affect other records as well.
• In the causal view, the dataset is first generated, and the value of one record is then changed
before computing the result of the mechanism.
While the causal view does not require any additional assumption to capture the intuition behind
DP, the associative view requires that either all records are independent in the original probability
distribution (the independence assumption), or the adversary must know all data points except one
(the strong adversary assumption, which we picked in the reformulation above).
These considerations can have a significant impact on DP variants and extensions, either leading
to distinct variants that attempt to capture the same intuition, or to the same variant being
interpreted in different ways.
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2.3 Properties
In this section, we introduce three main properties of differential privacy, that we then check against
variants and extensions of DP listed in this work.
Privacy Axioms
Two important properties of data privacy notions are called privacy axioms, proposed in [KL10,
KL12]. These are not axioms in a sense that they assumed to be true; rather, they are consistency
checks: properties that, if not satisfied by a data privacy definition, indicate a flaw in the definition2.
Definition 3 (Privacy axioms [KL10, KL12]).
1. Post-processing3 (or transformation invariance): A privacy definition Def satisfies the post-
processing axiom if, for any mechanism M satisfying Def and any probabilistic function f ,
the mechanism D → f(M (D)) also satisfies Def.
2. Convexity (or privacy axiom of choice): A privacy definition Def satisfies the convexity
axiom if, for any two mechanisms M1 and M2 satisfying Def, the mechanism M defined by
M (D) =M1(D) with probability p and M (D) =M2(D) with probability 1− p also satisfies
Def.
Most differential privacy variants and extensions, including the original definition of DP, satisfy
these axioms, although some do not. We highlighted these in Table 3 in Section 10.
Composition
A third important property is one of differential privacy’s main strengths: composability. It guar-
antees that the output of two mechanisms satisfying a privacy definition still satisfies the definition,
typically with a change in parameters. There are several types of composition: parallel composition,
sequential composition, and adaptive composition. We introduce the first two below.
Theorem (Parallel composition [Dwo06]). Let M1 be a ε1-differentially private mechanism, and
M2 a ε2-differentially private mechanism. For any dataset D, let D1 and D2 be the result of
an operation that separates records in two disjoint datasets. Then the mechanism M defined by
M (D) = (M1(D1),M2(D2)) is max(ε1, ε2)-differentially private.
This property allows us to build locally differentially private mechanisms, in which a central
server can compute global statistics without accessing the raw data from each user. In this work,
we focus on sequential composition, which we simply call composition.
Theorem (Sequential composition [Dwo06]). Let M1 be a ε1-differentially private mechanism,
and M2 a ε2-differentially private mechanism. Then the mechanism M defined by M (D) =
(M1(D),M2(D)) is (ε1 + ε2)-differentially private.
2The necessity of these were questioned in [HMQN13], where the authors showed a natural notions of anonymity
that contradict them.
3This definition must be slightly adapted for some variants, see for example Proposition 7 in Section 10.
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This theorem stays true ifM2 depends on the value ofM1(D): this variant is called adaptative
composition. This latter property allows to quantify the gain of information over time of an attacker
interacting with a differentially private query engine.
In this work, we only consider sequential composition, in the more abstract form formalized
below.
Definition 4 (Composability). A privacy definition Def with parameter α is composable if for any
two mechanisms M1 and M2 satisfying respectively α1-Def and α2-Def, the mechanism M (D) =
(M1(D),M2(D)) satisfies α-Def for some (non-trivial) α.
2.4 Relations between definitions
When learning about a new data privacy notion, it is often useful to know what are the known
relations between this notion and other definitions. However, definitions have parameters that often
have different meanings, and whose value is not directly comparable. To capture extensions, when
a definition can be seen as a special case of another, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 5 (Extensions). Let α-Def1 and β-Def2 be data privacy definitions. We say that Def1
is extended by Def2, and denote is as Def1 ⊂ Def2, if for all α, there is a value of β such that
α-Def1 is identical to β-Def2.
Concerning variants, to claim that a definition is stronger than another, we adopt the concept
of ordering established in [CY16] using α and β as tuples, encoding multiple parameters. Note that
we slightly changed the original definition as that only required the second condition to hold, which
would classify any extension as a stronger variant.
Definition 6 (Relative strength of privacy definitions). Let α-Def1 and β-Def2 be data privacy
definitions. We say that Def1 is stronger than Def2, and denote it Def1  Def2, if:
1. for all α, there is a β such that α-Def1 =⇒ β-Def2;
2. for all β, there is an α such that α-Def1 =⇒ β-Def2.
If Def1 is both stronger than and weaker than Def2, we say that the two definitions are equivalent,
and denote it Def1 ∼ Def2.
Relative strength implies a partial ordering on the space of possible definitions. On the other
hand, if two definitions are equivalent, this does not mean that they are equal: they could be only
equal up to a change in parameters. Both relations are reflexive and transitive; and we define the
symmetric counterpart of these relations as well (i.e., ≺ and ⊃). Moreover, for brevity, we combine
these two concepts in a single notation: if Def1 ⊂ Def2 and Def1  Def2, we say that Def2 is a
weaker extension of Def1, and denote it Def1 ⊂ Def2.
A summarizing table is presented at the end of this work, where for each definition, we also
highlight its dimensions and its relation to other notions. In Table 3, we also specify whether these
notions satisfy the privacy axioms and the composability property (X: yes, 7: no, ?: currently
unknown); in Section 10 we either provide a reference or a novel proof for each of these claims.
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3 Quantification of privacy loss (Q)
The risk model associated to differential privacy is a worst-case property: it quantifies not only
over all possible neighboring datasets but also over all possible outputs. However, in many real-
life risk assessments, events with vanishingly small probability are ignored, or their risk weighted
according to their probability. It is natural to consider analogous relaxations, especially since
these relaxations often have better composition properties, and enable natural mechanisms like the
Gaussian mechanism to be considered private [DR+14].
Most of the definitions within this section can be expressed using the privacy loss random
variable, first defined in [DN03] as the adversary’s confidence gain, so we first introduce this concept.
Roughly speaking, it measures how much information is revealed by the output of a mechanism.
Definition 7 (Privacy loss random variable [DN03]). Let M be a mechanism, and D1 and D2 two
datasets. The privacy loss random variable between M (D1) and M (D2) is defined as:
LM(D1)/M(D2)(O) = ln
(
P [M (D1) = O]
P [M (D2) = O]
)
.
if neither P [M (D1) = O] nor P [M (D2) = O] is 0; in case only P [M (D2) = O] is zero then
LM(D1)/M(D2)(O) = ∞, otherwise LM(D1)/M(D2)(O) = −∞. When the mechanism is clear from
context, we simply write LD1/D2 .
Differential privacy bounds the maximum value of LD1/D2 . Instead of considering the maximum
value, which corresponds to the worst possible output, relaxations of this section will allow a small
probability of error, consider the average of the privacy loss random variable, or describe its behavior
in finer ways.
3.1 Allowing a small probability of error
The first option, whose introduction is commonly attributed to [DKM+06], relaxes the definition
of ε-indistinguishability by allowing an additional small density of probability on which the upper
ε bound does not hold. This small density, denoted δ, can be used to compensate for outputs
for which the privacy loss is larger than eε. This led to the definition of approximate differential
privacy, often simply called (ε, δ)-DP. This is, by far, the most commonly used relaxation in the
scientific literature.
Definition 8 ((ε, δ)-differential privacy [DKM+06]). A privacy mechanism M is (ε, δ)-DP if for
any datasets D1 and D2 that differ only on one record, and for all S ⊆ O:
P [M (D1) ∈ S] ≤ eε · P [M (D2) ∈ S] + δ.
This definition is equivalent with Max-KL stability [BNS+16], a special case of algorithmic
stability, which requires that one change in an algorithm’s inputs does not change its output “too
much”.
The δ in (ε, δ)-DP is sometimes explained as the probability that the privacy loss of the output
is larger than eε (or, equivalently, that the ε-indistinguishability formula is satisfied). In fact, this
intuition corresponds to a different definition, first introduced in [MKA+08] as probabilistic DP
(ProDP), also called (ε, δ)-DP in distribution in [CO15]. A detailed explanation of the distinction
between the two definitions can be found in [Mei18].
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Definition 9 ((ε, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy [Mei18]). A privacy mechanism M is (ε, δ)-
probabilistically DP (ProDP) if for any datasets D1 and D2 that differ only on one record there is
a set S1 ⊆ O where P [M (D1) ∈ S1] ≤ δ, such that for all measurable sets S ⊆ O:
P [M (D1) ∈ S\S1] ≤ eε · P [M (D2) ∈ S\S1] .
It is straightforward to show that (ε, δ)-DP is stronger than (ε, δ)-ProDP (with no change in
parameters); a proof of the reverse result (with parameter change) is given in [ZWB+19]. Both
definitions can be reformulated using the privacy loss random variable.
Theorem. A mechanism M is:
• ε-DP ⇔ PO∼M(D1)
[LD1/D2(O) > ε] = 0 for all neighboring D1 and D2.
• (ε, δ)-DP ⇔ EO∼M(D1)
[
max
(
0, 1− eε−LD1/D2 (O)
)]
≤ δ for all neighboring D1 and D2.
• (ε, δ)-ProDP ⇔ PO∼M(D1)
[LD1/D2(O) > ε] ≤ δ for all neighboring D1 and D2.
Approximate and probabilistic differential privacy can be combined to form (ε, δa, δp)-relaxed
DP (RelDP) [ZQZ+15], which requires (ε, δa)-DP with probability at least 1− δp.
3.2 Averaging the privacy loss
As ε-DP corresponds to a worst-case risk model, it is natural to consider relaxations to allow for
larger privacy loss for some outputs. It is also natural to consider average-case risk models: allowing
larger privacy loss values only if lower values compensate it in other cases. One such relaxation is
called Kullback-Leibler privacy [BD14, CY16]: it considers the arithmetic mean of the privacy loss
random variable, which measures how much information is revealed when the output of a private
algorithm is observed.
Definition 10 (ε-Kullback-Leibler privacy [BD14, CY16]). A privacy mechanismM is ε-Kullback-
Leibler private (KLPr) if for all D1, D2 differing in one record:
EO∼M(D1)
[LD1/D2(O)] ≤ ε. (1)
Note that this formula can be expressed as DKL (M (D1) |M (D2)) ≤ ε where DKL is the Kullback-
Leibler-divergence.
ε-KL privacy considers the arithmetic mean of the privacy loss random variable or, equivalently,
the geometric mean of eLD1/D2 . This choice of averaging function does not attribute a lot of weight
to worst-case events, where LD1/D2 takes high values. Re´nyi DP extends this idea by adding a
parameter α ≥ 1, which allows controlling the choice of averaging function by bounding the αth
momentum of the privacy loss random variable.
Definition 11 ((α, ε)-Re´nyi differential privacy [Mir17]). Given α > 1, a privacy mechanism M
is (α, ε)-Re´nyi DP (RenyiDP) if for all pairs of neighboring datasets D1 and D2:
EO∼M(D1)
[
e(α−1)LD1/D2 (O)
]
≤ e(α−1)ε.
Note that this formula can be expressed as Dα (M (D1) |M (D2)) ≤ ε where Dα is the Re´nyi-
divergence of order α.
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This definition can be naturally extended by continuity to α = 1 (where it is equivalent to ε-KL
privacy) and α =∞ (where it is equivalent to ε-DP). Larger values of α lead to more weight being
assigned to worst-case events: (α, ε)-Re´nyi DP  (α′, ε)-Re´nyi DP iff α > α′. Besides α = 1 and
α =∞, Re´nyi DP has a simple interpretation for some values of α: α = 2 imposes a bound on the
arithmetic mean of eLD1/D2 , α = 3 imposes it on the quadratic mean, α = 4 on the cubic mean,
etc. A related technique is the moments accountant [ACG+16] which keeps track of a bound on
the moments of the privacy loss random variable during composition.
It is possible to use other divergence functions to obtain other relaxations. For example,
in [WBK18], the authors introduce two technical definitions, binary-|χ|α DP (b-|χ|α DP) and
tenary-|χ|α DP (t-|χ|α DP), as part of a proof on amplification by sampling. Other examples of
divergences can lead to other variants, like ε-total variation privacy [BD14] (ε-TVPr, using the
total variance) and quantum DP [Col16] (QDP, using the quantum divergence).
Another possibility to average the privacy loss is to use mutual information to formalize the
intuition that any individual record should not “give out too much information” on the output of the
mechanism (or vice-versa). This is captured by ε-mutual-information DP (MIDP) [CY16], which
guarantees that the mutual information between M (D) and D(i) conditioned on D−i is under a
certain threshold. The bound is taken over all possible priors on D, which avoids having to reason
about the attacker’s background knowledge. This definition, along with KL-privacy, are technically
stronger than approximate DP, but the change in parameters was criticized for not providing a
strong enough guarantee [McS17].
Theorem. For all ε > 0, δ ≤ 1, and α ≤ 1:
• ε-DP =⇒ min{ε, ε2}-KLPr (Lemma 1 in [CY16])
• ε-KLPr =⇒ ε-MIDP ⇒ (0,√2ε)-DP (Lemma 1 and 2 in [CY16])
• ε-DP =⇒ (α, ε)-Re´nyiDP⇒
(
ε+ log
(
α−1
α
)− log(δ)+log(α)α−1 , δ)-DP (Theorem 21 in [BBG+19])
3.3 Controlling the tail distribution of the privacy loss
Some definitions go further than simply considering a worst-case bound on the privacy loss, or
averaging it across the distribution. They try to obtain the benefits of (ε, δ)-DP with a smaller ε
which holds in most cases, but control the behavior of the bad cases better than (ε, δ)-DP, which
allows for catastrophic privacy loss in rare cases.
The first attempt to formalize this idea was proposed in [DR16], where the authors introduce
concentrated DP (later renamed to mean-concentrated DP (mCoDP) in [BS16]). In this definition,
a parameter controls the privacy loss variable globally, and another parameter allows for some
outputs to have a greater privacy loss; while still requiring that the difference is smaller than a
Gaussian distribution. In [BS16], the authors show that this definition does not satisfy the post-
processing axiom, and propose another formalization of the same idea called zero-concentrated DP
(zCoDP) [BS16], which requires that the privacy loss random variable is concentrated around zero.
Definition 12 ((ξ, ρ)-zero-concentrated differential privacy [BS16]). A mechanism M is (ξ, ρ)-
zero-concentrated DP if for all pairs of neighboring datasets D1 and D2 and all α > 1:
EO∼M(D1)
[
e(α−1)LD1/D2 (O)
]
≤ e(α−1)(ξ+ρα).
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Four more variants of concentrated DP exist:
• (ξ, ρ, δ)-approximate zero-concentrated DP [BS16] (AzCoDP), which relaxes (ξ, ρ)-zCoDP by
only taking the Re´nyi divergence on events with probability higher than 1 − δ instead of on
the full distribution.
• (ξ, ρ, ω)-bounded CoDP [BS16] (bCoDP) relaxes (ξ, ρ)-zCoDP by requiring the inequality to
hold only for α ≤ ω.
• (ρ, ω)-truncated CoDP [BDRS18] (tCoDP[BDRS18]) relaxes (0, ρ)-zCoDP in the same way.
• (ξ, τ)-truncated CoDP [Col16] (tCoDP[Col16]) requires the Re´nyi divergence to be smaller than
min(ξ, ατ) for all α ≥ 1.
The relations between these definitions and other notions in this section is well-understood. Besides
the special cases (e.g., (ρ,∞)-tCoDP[BDRS18] is the same as (0, ρ)-zCoDP) and the relations that
are a direct consequence of the definitions (e.g., (ξ, ρ)-zCoDP is the same as the condition “(ξ+ρα)-
Re´nDP for all α > 0”), we list known relations below.
Theorem. For all ε > 0, δ > 0, µ > 0, τ > 0, ξ ≥ 0 and ω > 1:
• ε-DP =⇒
(
ε(eε−1)
2 , ε
)
-mCoDP (Theorem 3.5 in [DR16])
• ε-DP =⇒
(
0, ε
2
2
)
-zCoDP (Lemma 8.3 in [BS16])
• ε-DP ⇐⇒ (ε, 0)-zCoDP (Lemma 3.2 in [BS16])
• (µ, τ)-mCoDP =⇒
(
µ− τ22 , τ
2
2
)
-zCoDP (Lemma 4.2 in [BS16])
• (ξ, ρ)-zCoDP =⇒ (ξ + ρ,O(√ξ + 2ρ))-mCoDP (Lemma 4.3 in [BS16])
• (ξ, ρ)-zCoDP =⇒
(
ξ + ρ+
√
4ρ log
(
min(1,
√
piρ)
δ
)
, δ
)
-DP (Lemma 3.5 and 3.6 in [BS16])
•
(
ξ +
√
ρ log 1δ
)
-DP =⇒ (ξ − ρ4 + 5 4√ρ, ρ4)-zCoDP (Lemma 3.7 in [BS16])
• (ρ, ω)-tCoDP[BDRS18] ⇒ (εˆ, δ)-DP, where εˆ = ρ + 2
√
ρ log 1ρ if log
1
δ ≤ (ω − 1)2ρ, and εˆ =
ρω +
log 1δ
ω−1 otherwise (Lemma 6 in [BDRS18])
3.4 Extension
Most definitions of this section can be seen as bounding the divergence between M (D1) and
M (D2), for different possible divergence functions. In [BD14], the authors use this fact to gener-
alize them and define (f, ε)-divergence DP (DivDP), which takes the particular divergence used as
a parameter f .
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Definition 13 ((f, ε)-divergence differential privacy [BD14]). Let f be a convex function such as
f(1) = 0. A privacy mechanism M is (f, ε)-divergence DP if for all pairs of neighboring datasets
D1, D2:
EO∼M(D1)
[
f
(
eLD1/D2
)] ≤ ε.
An instance of this definition was presented in [DR18] as (fk, ε)-divergence DP ; which requires
that EO∼M(D1)
[∣∣eLD1/D2 − 1∣∣k] ≤ εk. This definition is mainly used to prove technical results on
privacy/utility tradeoffs in the local model. For any k ≤ 1, ε-DP implies (fk, eε − 1)-DivDP, and
when k = 2, it is equivalent to
(
2, log
(
1 + ε2
))
-Re´nyiDP (Section 2 in [DR18]).
Moreover, capacity bounded differential privacy (CBDP) was introduced in [CIM19], which uses
H-restricted f -divergence: DHf (P |Q) = suph∈H [Ex∼P [h(x)]− Ex∼Q [f∗(h(x))]] where f is a diver-
gence, H is a family of functions, and f∗ is the Fenchel conjugate4. In other words, it requires
the supremum condition to hold only for a selected set of functions (queries) instead of all possible
ones.
Finally, most definitions in this section taking two real-valued parameters can be extended
to use a family of parameters rather than a single pair of parameters. As shown in [SMM19]
(Theorem 2) for approximate DP, probabilistic DP, and Re´nyi DP, finding the tightest possible
family of parameters (for either definition) for a given mechanism is equivalent to specifying the
behavior of its privacy loss random variable entirely.
3.5 Multidimensional definitions
Allowing a small probability of error δ by using the same concept as in (ε, δ)-DP is very common;
many new DP definitions were proposed in the literature with such a parameter. Unless it creates a
particularly notable effect, we do not mention it explicitly and present the definitions without this
parameter.
Definitions in this section can be used as standalone concepts: (ε, δ)-DP is omnipresent in the
literature, and the principle of averaging risk is natural enough for Re´nyi privacy to be used in
practical settings, like posterior sampling [GSC17] or resistance to adversarial inputs in machine
learning [PYGPA19]. Most variants in this section, however, are only used as technical tools to get
better results on composition or privacy amplification [DR+14, WBK18, FMTT18, LK18].
4 Neighborhood definition (N)
The original definition of differential privacy considers datasets differing in one record. Thus, the
datasets can differ in two possible ways: either they have the same size and differ only on one
record, or one is a copy of the other with one extra record. These two options do not protect the
same thing: the former protects the value of the records while the latter also protects their presence
in the data: together, they protect any property about a single individual.
In many scenarios, it makes sense to protect a different property about their dataset, e.g., the
value of a specific sensitive field, or entire groups of individuals. It is straightforward to adapt DP
to protect different sensitive properties: all one has to do is change the definition of neighborhood
in the original definition.
4The Fenchel conjugate for a function f with a domain R is f∗(x) = supy∈R[xy − f(y)].
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4.1 Changing the sensitive property
The original definition states that the ε-indistinguishability propery should hold for “any datasets
D1 and D2 that differ only on the data of one individual”. Modifying the set of pairs (D1, D2) such
that M (D1) ≈εM (D2) is equivalent to changing the protected sensitive property.
Weaker relaxations
In DP, the difference between D1 and D2 is sometimes interpreted as “one record value is different”,
or “one record has been added or removed”. In [KM11], the authors formalize these two options as
bounded DP and unbounded DP. They also introduced attribute DP and bit DP, for smaller changes
within the differing record.
Definition 14 ([KM11]). If a privacy mechanism M satisfies M (D1) ≈ε M (D2) for any pair
D1, D2, where D1 can be obtained from D2 by. . .
• . . . adding or removing one record, then M is ε-unbounded DP (uBoDP).
• . . . changing exactly one record, then M is ε-bounded DP (BoDP).
• . . . changing one attribute in a record, then M is ε-attribute DP (AttDP).
• . . . changing one bit of an attribute in a record, then M is ε-bit DP (BitDP).
In [KM11], authors show that ε-unbounded DP implies 2ε-bounded DP, as changing a record
can be seen as deleting it and adding a new one in its place. The original definition of ε-DP is the
conjunction of ε-unbounded DP and ε-bounded DP. However, bounded DP is frequently used in
the literature, especially when using local differential privacy, and often simply called differential
privacy. It is also sometimes renamed, like in [FMTT18], where the authors call it per-person DP.
Variants of differential privacy that do not protect individuals, but single contributions (in the
case where the same person can contribute multiple times to a dataset), are also often used in
practice, especially for machine learning applications [MRTZ17]. Some recent works also argue
that in-between definitions are appropriate: rather than protecting a single contribution or entire
users contributions, authors in [ADJ19] suggest that protecting elements that reveal information
about users, after deduplicating or clustering contributions. For example, rather than protecting
all website visits by a single user, or each visit individually, one might choose to protect the fact
that a user ever visited a website (but not whether the user visited the same website once or many
times). They call the corresponding definition element-level DP (ELDP).
Another way to relax the neighborhood definition in DP is to consider that only certain types
of information are sensitive. For example, if the attacker learns that their target has cancer, this is
more problematic than if they learn that their target does not have cancer. This idea is captured in
one-sided DP (OSDP) [DKH+17]: the neighbors of a dataset D are obtained by replacing a single
sensitive record with any other record (sensitive or not). The idea of sensitivity is formalized by
a policy P , which specifies which records are sensitive. This idea cannot be captured simply by
ε-indistinguishability, since one-sided DP is asymmetric.
Definition 15 ((P, ε)-one-sided differential privacy [DKH+17]). Given a policy P ⊆ T , a privacy
mechanism M is (P, ε)-one-sided DP iff for all datasets D1 and D2, where D2 has been obtained
by replacing a record t ∈ D1 ∩ P by any other record and for all S ⊆ O:
P [M (D1) ∈ S] ≤ eε · P [M (D2) ∈ S] .
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When P = T , this is equivalent to bounded DP. Similar ideas were proposed in multiple papers:
• In [APV19], the authors propose sensitive privacy, which determines which records are sen-
sitive based on the data itself and a normality property N and a graph-based definition of
k-neighborhood, instead of using a data-independent determination.
• In [BSW18], the authors introduce anomaly-restricted DP, which assumes that there is only
one outlier in the dataset, and that this outlier should not be protected.
Stronger notions
More restrictive definitions are also possible. First, some definitions make the definition of neigh-
borhood more explicit when a single person can contribute multiple times to a dataset; this is the
case for client/participant DP, defined in [MRTZ17]. In [Dwo08], the authors implicitly define (c, ε)-
group privacy considers datasets that do not differ in one record, but possibly several, to protect
multiple individuals. This can also be interpreted as taking correlations into account when using
DP: DP under correlation [CFYD14] uses an extra parameter to describe the maximum number of
records that the change of one individual can influence.
These two definitions are formally equivalent; but the implicit interpretation of DP behind them
is different. (c, ε)-group privacy is compatible with the associative view under the strong adversary
assumption (the adversary knows all records except c) or the causal view (c records are changed
after the data is generated). Meanwhile, DP under correlation implicitly considers the associative
view with the independence assumption; and tries to relax that assumption. This last approach was
further developed via dependent DP [LCM16], which uses “dependence relationships” to describe
how much the variation in one record can influence the other records.
Definition 16 ((R, c, ε)-dependent differential privacy [LCM16]). A privacy mechanism M pro-
vides (R, c, ε)-dependent DP (DepDP) where R is the probabilistic dependence relationship and c
is the dependence size, if for any pair of datasets D1 and D2, where D2 has been obtained from
D1 by changing one record and the corresponding at most c − 1 other records according to R,
M (D1) ≈εM (D2).
Note that when R is the empty relation, or when c = 1, this definition is equivalent to bounded
DP: under the associative view of DP, this represents independence between records. Similar defi-
nitions appear in [WDN17, WWK+17] as correlated DP (CorDP), in which correlations are defined
by an observation on other datasets, and in in [YSN15] as bayesian DP5 (BayDP[YSN15]), where
the neighborhood relation is defined by an adversary having some knowledge about correlations in
the data. An extension is proposed in [LRYY19] as prior DP (PriDP) which considers a family of
adversaries instead of a single adversary.
The strongest possible variant is considered in [KM11], where the authors define free lunch
privacy (FLPr), in which the attacker must be unable to distinguish between any two datasets, even
if they are completely different. This guarantee is a reformulation of Dalenius’ privacy goal [Dal77];
as such, all mechanisms that satisfy free lunch privacy have a near-total lack of utility.
Definition 17 (ε-free lunch privacy [KM11]). A privacy mechanismM satisfies ε-free lunch privacy
if M (D1) ≈εM (D2) for any pair of datasets D1, D2.
5There are two other notions with the same name: introduced in [TF19, LL12], we mention them in Section 5
and 6 respectively.
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4.2 Limiting the scope of the definition
Redefining the neighborhood property can also be used to reduce the scope of the definitions.
In [SCDFSM17], the authors note that DP requires ε-indistinguishability of results between any
pair of neighboring data sets, but in practice, the data custodian has only one data set D they
want to protect. Thus, they only require ε-indistinguishability between this data set D and all
its neighbors, calling the resulting definition individual DP (InDP). An equivalent definition was
proposed in [CH16] as conditioned DP.
Definition 18 ((D, ε)-individual differential privacy [SCDFSM17]). Given a dataset D ∈ D, a
privacy mechanism M satisfies (D, ε)-individual DP if for any data set D′ that differs in at most
one record from D, M (D) ≈εM (D′).
This definition was further restricted in [Wan17] where besides fixing a dataset D, a record t is
also fixed.
4.3 Applying the definition to other types of input
Many adaptations of differential privacy are simply changing the neighborhood definition to protect
different types of input data than datasets. A few examples follow.
• In [EG16, CBY+18, XX15], the authors adopted differential privacy for locations. In [EG16]
the authors defined location privacy, in which neighbors are datasets which differ in at most
one record, and the two differing records are at a physical distance smaller than a given
threshold. This definition also appears in [CBY+18] as DP on r-location set6. Several more
location-related differential privacy variants were defined in [NV20]: untrackability (which
adopts differential privacy for set of locations by protecting whether they originated from a
single user or by two users), undetectability and multi user untrackability, (which extend this
idea further by not assuming both sets originated from the same private data and to multiple
users respectively).
• In [HLMJ09, TC12, Reu18, Pin18, SXK+19, DWWG13], the authors adopt differential privacy
to graph-structured data. In [HLMJ09], authors present multiple alternative definitions, which
protect different parts of the graph: the strongest is node-DP, which protects a node and all its
edges; the weakest is edge-DP, only protects one edge; and an intermediate definition is k-edge-
DP, which protects a total of k edges and nodes. In [TC12], the authors introduce out-link
privacy, which protects all outgoing edges from a given node. In [Reu18], the author introduces
QL-edged-labeled DP similar to out-link privacy, but only protecting a predetermined subset
of outgoing edges. In [Pin18], the author introduces l1-weighted DP, in which graph edges are
weighted, and graphs are neighbors when the total weight of their differing edges is smaller
than 1; this notion was also defined implicitly in [Sea16]. In [SXK+19], the authors define
decentralized DP which extends the graph neighborhood to two jumps. In [KRWY16], the
authors introduce protected DP, which adapts DP for graphs and guarantees that no observer
can learn much about the set of edges corresponding to any protected node while offering
no guarantees for the other nodes. Finally, in [DWWG13] the authors introduce seamless
privacy, which rather than protecting characteristics of a specific input graph, it ensures that
certain pairs of queries on this graph return similar answers.
6Distinct from DP on δ-location set [XX15], which we mention in Section 5.
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• In [DNPR10, DNP+10, Dwo10, KPXP14, Far19a, WSMD20], authors adapt differential pri-
vacy to a streaming context, where the attacker can access the mechanism’s internal states.
In [DNPR10, DNP+10, Dwo10], authors define pan-privacy, which comes in two variants:
event-level pan-privacy (called strong DP in [WSMD20]) protects individual events, and user-
level pan-privacy protects all events associated to a single user. In [KPXP14], the authors
extend the previous idea and propose w-event privacy, which protects any event sequence oc-
curring within a window of at most w timestamps. In [Far19a, NV20] this was further extended
to an infinite horizon via discounted differential privacy (which keep assigning smaller-and-
smaller weights to further-and-further events) and everlasting privacy (which limit the leakage
of information users suffer, no matter how many executions a mechanism had), respectively.
• In [WCM18] the authors adopt differential privacy for Random Access Memory and Private
Information Retrieval. For RAM the neighborhood is defined over the sequence of logical
memory requests over time; the same notion appears in [CCMS19] as differential obliviousness
and in [ADK+19] as oblivious DP. The adaptation of neighborhood is similar in case of PIR; a
similar notion appears in [TDG16] as ε-private PIR and in [PPY19] as ε-DPIR. Additionally,
in [KKNO17], the authors use a similar idea to define differential privacy for outsourced
database systems.
• In [JLH19], the authors adapt differential privacy for symbolic control systems, and introduce
word-DP and substitution-word-DP, protecting respectively pairs of words whose Levenshtein
distance is lower than a given parameter, or whose Hamming distance is lower than a given
parameter.
• In [ZSZ+18], the authors adapt differential privacy for text vectors, and propose text indis-
tinguishability, in which the neighborhood relationship between two word vectors depends on
their Euclidean distance.
• In [YLL+17] the authors defined set operation DP, which adopts differential privacy for set
operations where {D1, D2} and {D1, D2}′ are neighbor if either D1 and D′1 or D2 and D′2 are
neighbors.
• In [YWW13, LAG+19], the authors define refinement DP and pixel DP respectively, which
adopts the definition for images with neighbors given by some transformation or metric.
• In [HD19], the authors adopt DP to gossip protocols to protect the privacy of information
source.
• In [Noz19], the authors define functional DP, which adopts differential privacy for functions.
• In [SSB16], the authors define phenotypic DP, which adopts differential privacy for genomic
data, where the difference in the phenotype vector defines the neighborhood.
• In [GKPT15], the authors adapt differential privacy to recommendation systems, and define
distance-based DP, which protects not only a given user recommendation but also all the
recommendations of a given user for similar items.
• In [LBG17], the authors adapt differential privacy to machine learning, and define differential
training privacy, which quantifies the risk of membership inference of a record with respect
to a classifier and its training data.
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• In [TD16], the authors define DP for bandit algorithms, where the neighborhood notion is
defined by changing any single reward in a multi-armed bandit game sequence. In [BDT19],
this definition is renamed to instantaneous DP (Def 5), and few more variants are proposed
for this problem space: local DP for bandits, pan-privacy for bandits, sequential privacy for
bandits, and environment privacy for bandits.
4.4 Extensions
It is natural to generalize the variants of this section to arbitrary neighboring relationships. One
example is mentioned in [KM11], under the name generic DP7 (GcDP[KM11]), where the neighboring
relation is entirely captured by a relation R between datasets.
Definition 19 ((R, ε)-generic differential privacy [KM11]). Given a relation R ⊆ D2, a privacy
mechanism M satisfies (R, ε)-generic DP if for all (D1, D2) ∈ R, M (D1) ≈εM (D2).
This definition is symmetric, but it can easily be modified to accommodate asymmetric defini-
tions like one-sided DP.
Other definitions use different formalizations to also generalize the concept of changing the
neighborhood relationship. Some (like pufferfish privacy, mentioned in Section 6) use pairs of
predicates (φ1, φ2) that D1 and D2 must respectively satisfy to be neighbors. Others (like coupled-
worlds privacy, mentioned in Section 8) use private functions, denoted priv, and define neighbors to
be datasets D1 and D2 such as priv (D1) 6= priv (D2) [BGKS13]. Others use a distance function d
between datasets, and neighbors are defined as datasets a distance lower than a given threshold ∆;
this is the case for DP under a neighborhood (DPUN), introduced in [FC14], adjacent DP (AdjDP),
introduced in [KM18]8, constrained DP (ConsDP), introduced in [ZLW09] (where the distance d
captures a utility-related constraint), and distributional privacy9 (DlPr[ZLW09]), also introduced
in [ZLW09] (with additional constraints on the neighborhood definition: neighboring datasets must
be part of a fixed set SD and have elements in common). This distance can also be defined as the
sensitivity of the mechanism, like in sensitivity-induced DP [RA17] (SIDP), or implicitly defined by
a set of constraints, like what is done implicitly in [KM11] via induced neighbors DP (INDP).
One notable instantiation of generic DP is blowfish privacy (BFPr) [HMD14]. Its major build-
ing blocks are a policy graph G, that specifies which pairs of domain values in T should not be
distinguished between by an adversary; and a set of constraints Q that specifies the set IQ of pos-
sible datasets that the definition protects. It was inspired by the Pufferfish framework [KM12] (see
Section 6), but the attacker is not assumed to have uncertainty over the data: instead, it models
an attacker whose knowledge is a set of deterministic constraints on the data.
Definition 20 ((G, IQ, ε)-blowfish privacy [HMD14, HMD15]). Given a policy graph G ∈ T 2 and
a set of datasets IQ, a privacy mechanism M satisfies (G, ε)-blowfish privacy if for all datasets D1
and D2 in IQ that differ in only one element i such that (D1(i), D2(i)) ∈ G, M (D1) ≈εM (D2).
As noted in [HMD14], a mechanism satisfies ε-bounded DP if and only if satisfies (K, In, ε)-
blowfish privacy, where K is the complete graph, and In is any datasets of size n. A particular
instantiation of this idea is explored in [KM11] as induced DP (IndDP), where the definition of
neighbors is induced by a set of constraints.
7Another definition with the same name is introduced in [KL10, KL12], we mention it in Section 5.
8Originally simply called “differential privacy” by its authors.
9Another definition with the same name is introduced in [Rot10, BLR13], we mention it in Section 5.
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4.5 Multidimensional definitions
Modifying the protected property is orthogonal to modifying the risk model implied by the quan-
tification of privacy loss: it is straightforward to combine these two dimensions. Indeed, many
definitions mentioned in this section were actually introduced with a δ parameter allowing for
a small probability of error. One particularly general example is adjacency relation divergence
DP [KM19a], which combines an arbitrary neighborhood definition (like in generic DP) with an
arbitrary divergence function (like in divergence DP).
As the examples in Section 4.3 show, it is very common to change the definition of neighborhood
in practical contexts to adapt what aspect of the data is protected. Further, local DP mechanisms
like RAPPOR [EPK14] implicitly use bounded DP: the participation of one individual is not secret,
only the value of their record is protected. Variants that limit the scope of the definition to one
particular dataset or user, however, provide few formal guarantees and do not seem to be used in
practice.
5 Variation of privacy loss (V)
In DP, the privacy parameter ε is uniform: the level of protection is the same for all protected
users or attributes, or equivalently, only the level of risk for the most at-risk user is considered.
In practice, some users might require a higher level of protection than others or a data custodian
might want to consider the level of risk across all users, rather than only considering the worst case.
Some definitions take this into account by allowing the privacy loss to vary across inputs, either
explicitly (by associating each user to an acceptable level of risk), or implicitly (by allowing some
users to be at risk, or averaging the risk across users).
5.1 Varying the privacy level across inputs
In Section 4, we saw how changing the definition of the neighborhood can be used to adapt the
definition of privacy and protect different aspects of the input data. However, the privacy protection
in those variants is binary: either a given property is protected, or it was not. A possible option to
generalize this idea further is to allow the privacy level to vary across possible inputs.
One natural example is to consider that some users might have higher privacy requirements
than others, and make the ε vary according to which user differs between the two datasets. This is
done in personalized DP (PerDP), a notion first defined informally in [NAD14], then independently
in [JYC15, ESS15, GR15, LWS15]. An equivalent notion is also defined in [AGK15] as heterogeneous
DP, while a location-based definition is presented in [DA18] as personalized location DP.
Definition 21 (Ψ-personalized differential privacy [JYC15]). A privacy mechanism M provides
Ψ-personalized DP if for every pair of neighboring datasets (D,D−i) and for all sets of outputs
S ⊆ O:
P [M (D−i) ∈ S] ≤ eΨ(D(i))P [M (D) ∈ S]
where Ψ is a privacy specification: Ψ : T → R+ maps the records to personal privacy preferences
and Ψ (D(i)) denotes the privacy preference of the i-th record.
As shown in [JYC15, CD20], ε-DP implies Ψ-PerDP, where Ψ(t) = ε for all t ∈ T ; and Ψ-PerDP
implies ε-DP where ε = maxt Ψ(t).
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This definition can be seen as a refinement of the intuition behind one-sided DP, which separated
records into sensitive and non-sensitive ones. The idea of making the privacy level vary across inputs
can be generalized further, by also making the privacy level depend on the entire dataset, and not
only in the differing record. This is done in [LP15], where the authors define tailored DP (TaiDP).
Definition 22 (Ψ-tailored differential privacy [LP15]). A mechanism M satisfies Ψ-tailored dif-
ferential privacy for Ψ : T × D → R∞0 if for any dataset D, M (D) ≈ε(D(i),D) M (D−i).
This concept can be applied to strengthen or weaken the privacy requirement for a record
depending on whether they are an outlier in the dataset. In [LP15], the authors formalize this idea
and introduce outlier privacy, which tailors an individual’s protection level to their “outlierness”.
Other refinements are also introduced in [LP15]: simple outlier privacy (SOPr), simple outlier DP
(SODP), and staircase outlier privacy (SCODP). A similar idea was explored in [KLL19], which
introduced pareto DP (ParDP): it utilizes a pareto distribution of parameters (p, r) to separate a
large number of low-frequency individuals from a small number of high-frequency, and the sensitivity
is calculated based on only the low-frequency individuals.
Finally, varying the privacy level across inputs also makes sense in continuous scenarios, where
the neighborhood relationship between two datasets is not binary, but quantified. This is, for
example, the case for ε-geo-indistinguishability [ABCP13], where two datasets D1 and D2 are
considered r-neighbors if the only different record between D1 and D2 are at a distance r of each
other, and the ε grows linearly with r.
5.2 Randomizing the variation of privacy levels
Varying the privacy level across inputs can also be done in a randomized way, by guaranteeing that
some random fraction of users have a certain privacy level. One example is proposed in [HRW11]
as random DP (RanDP): the authors note that rather than requiring DP to hold for any possible
datasets, it is natural to only consider realistic datasets, and allow “edge-case” or very unrealistic
datasets to not be protected. This is captured by generating the data randomly, and allowing a
small proportion γ of cases to not satisfy the ε-indistinguishability property.
Definition 23 ((pi, γ, ε)-random differential privacy [HRW11]). Let pi be a probability distribution
on T , D1 a dataset generated by drawing n i.i.d. elements in pi, and D2 the same dataset as D1,
except one element was changed to a new element drawn from pi. A mechanism M is (pi, γ, ε)-
random DP if M (D1) ≈εM (D2), with probability at least 1− γ on the choice of D1 and D2.
The exact meaning of “with probability at least 1 − γ on the choice of D1 and D2” can vary
slightly. In [Hal12] and in [McC15], the authors introduce predictive DP (PredDP) and model-
specific DP respectively, which quantify over all possible choices of D1, and picks D2 randomly in
the neighborhood of D1. In [DJRT13], D1 and D2 are both taken out of a set of density larger
than 1−γ, and the authors call this definition generalized DP (GdDP). The distribution generating
the dataset is also not always assumed to be generating i.i.d. records; we denote the corresponding
parameter by θ.
Random DP might look similar to probabilistic DP: in both cases, there is a small probability
that the privacy loss is unbounded. On the other hand, they are very different: in random DP,
this probability is computed inputs of the mechanisms (i.e., users or datasets), for probabilistic
DP, it is computed across mechanism outputs. Also similarly to probabilistic DP, excluding some
cases altogether creates definitional issues: random DP does not satisfy the convexity axiom (see
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Proposition 5 in Section 10). We postulate that using a different tool to allow some inputs to not
satisfy the mechanism, similar to approximate DP or Re´nyi DP, could solve this problem.
Usually, data-generating distributions are used for other purposes: they typically model an
adversary with partial knowledge. However, definitions in this section still compare the outputs of
the mechanisms given fixed neighboring datasets: the only randomness in the indistinguishability
property comes from the mechanism. By contrast, definitions of Section 6 compare the output
of the mechanism on a random dataset, so the randomness comes both from the data-generating
distribution and the mechanism.
5.3 Multidimensional definitions
As varying the privacy level or limiting the considered datasets are two distinct way of relaxing
differential privacy, it is possible to combine them with the previously mentioned dimensions.
Combination with N
The definitions described in Section 4 (e.g., generic DP or blowfish privacy) have the same privacy
constraint for all neighboring datasets. Thus, they cannot capture definitions that vary the privacy
level across inputs. However, both ideas can be naturally captured together via distance functions.
In [CABP13], the authors introduce dD-privacy (dD-Pr), in which the function dD takes both
datasets as input, and returns the corresponding maximal privacy loss (the ε) depending on the
difference between the two datasets.
Definition 24 (dD-privacy [CABP13]). Let dD : D2 → R∞. A privacy mechanism M satisfies
dD-privacy if for all pairs of datasets D1, D2 and all sets of outputs S ⊆ O:
P [M (D1) ∈ S] ≤ edD(D1,D2) · P [M (D2) ∈ S] .
When dD is proportional to the Hamiltonian difference between datasets, this is equivalent to
ε-DP. In dD-privacy, the dD function specifies both the privacy parameter and the definition of
neighborhood: it can simply return ∞ on non-neighboring datasets, and vary the privacy level
across inputs for neighboring datasets. In the original definition, the authors impose that dD is
symmetric, but this condition can also be relaxed to allow dD-privacy to extend definitions like
one-sided DP.
Equivalent definitions of dD-privacy also appeared in [EG16] as l-privacy, and in [KM19b] as
extended DP. Several other definitions, such as weighted DP [PGM14] (WeiDP), smooth DP [BD14]
(SmoDP) and earth mover’s privacy [FDM19] (EMDP), can be seen as particular instantiations
of dD-privacy for specific functions d measuring the distance between datasets. This is also the
case for some definitions tailored for location privacy, like geo-graph-indistinguishability [TCAY19],
which specifically applies to network graphs.
Random DP can also be combined with changing the neighborhood definition: in [XX15], the
authors define DP on a δ-location set10, for which the neighborhood is defined by a set of “plausible”
locations around the true location of a user. A notable definition using the same combination of
dimensions is distributional privacy11, introduced in [Rot10, BLR13]: it combines random DP (for
a large family of distributions) and free lunch privacy.
10Distinct from DP on r-location set [CBY+18], which we mention in Section 4.
11Another definition with the same name is introduced in [ZLW09], we mention it in Section 4.
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Definition 25 ((ε, γ)-distributional privacy [Rot10, BLR13]). An algorithm M satisfies (ε, γ)-
distributional privacy (DlPr[Rot10, BLR13]) if for any distribution pi over possible tuples, if D1, D2 ∈
D are picked by randomly drawing a fixed number n of elements from pi without replacement, then
with probability at least 1− γ over the choice of D1 and D2, M (D1) ≈εM (D2).
Interestingly, this definition captures an intuition similar to the variants in 8: the adversary can
only learn properties of the data-generating distribution, but not about particular samples (except
with probability lower than γ). The authors also prove that if M is (ε, γ)-DlPr and γ = o( 1n2 ),
where n is the size of the dataset being generated, then M is also ε-DP.
Combination with Q
Different risk models, like the definitions in Section 3, are also compatible with varying the privacy
parameters across inputs. For example, in [Kre19], the author proposes endogeneous DP (EndDP),
which is a combination of (ε, δ)-DP and personalized DP. Similarly, pseudo-metric DP (PsDP),
defined in [DNM+13], is a combination of dD-privacy and (ε, δ)-DP; while extended divergence DP
(EDivDP), defined in [KM19a], is a combination of dD-privacy and divergence DP.
Randomly limiting the scope of the definition can also be combined with ideas from the previous
sections. For example, in [TF19], the authors introduce weak Bayesian DP (WBDP), which com-
bines random DP and approximate DP. In [WLF16], the authors introduce on average KL privacy,
which uses KL-divergence as quantification metric, but only requires the property to hold for an
“average dataset”, like random DP; a similar notion appears in [FS18] as average leave-one-out KL
stability. In [TF19, DBB20], the authors introduce Bayesian DP12 (BayDP[TF19]) and privacy at
risk (PAR) respectively; both definitions combine random DP with probabilistic DP, with slightly
different approaches: the former quantifies over all possible datasets and changes one fixed record
randomly, while the latter selects both datasets randomly, conditioned on these datasets being
neighbors.
In [KL10], Kifer et al. go further and generalize the intuition from generic DP, introduced in
Section 4, and generalize the indistinguishability condition entirely. The resulting definition is also
called generic differential privacy.
Definition 26 ((R,M)-generic differential privacy [KL10, KL12]). A privacy mechanism M sat-
isfies (R,M)-generic DP (GcDP[KL10]) if for all measurable sets S ⊆ O and for all (D1, D2) ∈ R:
MD1,D2(P [M (D1) ∈ S]) ≥ P [M (D2) ∈ S] and MD1,D2(P [M (D1) /∈ S]) ≥ P [M (D2) /∈ S]
where MD1,D2 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a concave function continuous on (0, 1) such as MD1,D2(1) = 1.
The privacy relationR is still the generalization of neighborhood and the privacy predicate is the
generalization of the ε-indistinguishability to arbitrary functions. In particular, it can encompass all
variants of described in Section 3 in addition to the ones in this section: for example, if MD1,D2(x) =
min (1, xeε + δ, 1− (1− x− δ)e−ε) holds for for all D1 and D2, then this is equivalent to (ε, δ)-DP.
This definition was an attempt at finding the most generic definition that still satisfies privacy
axioms: another extension defined in the same work, abstract DP (AbsDP) is even more generic,
but no longer satisfies the privacy axioms.
12There are two other notions with the same name: introduced in [YSN15, LL12], we mention them in Section 4
and 6 respectively.
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Definitions in this section are particularly used in the context of local DP13 and in particular for
applications to location privacy: various metrics have been discussed to quantify how indistinguish-
able different places should be to provide users of a local DP mechanism with meaningful privacy
protection [CEP+17].
6 Background knowledge (B)
In differential privacy, the attacker is implicitly assumed to have full knowledge of the dataset: their
only uncertainty is whether the target belongs in the dataset or not. This implicit assumption is
also present for the definitions of the previous dimensions: indeed, the attacker has to distinguish
between two fixed datasets D1 and D2. The only source of randomness in ε-indistinguishability
comes from the mechanism itself. In many cases, this assumption is unrealistic, and it is natural
to consider weaker adversaries, who do not have full background knowledge. One of the main
motivations to do so is to use significantly less noise in the mechanism [Dua09].
The typical way to represent this uncertainty formally is to assume that the input data comes
from a certain probability distribution (named data evolution scenario in [KM12]): the randomness
of this distribution models the attacker’s uncertainty. Informally, the more random this probability
distribution is, the less knowledge the attacker has. However, the definition that follows depends
whether DP is considered with the associative or the causal view. In the associative view, the
sensitive property changes before the data is generated: it conditions the data-generating probability
distribution. In the causal view, however, the sensitive property is only changed after the data is
generated. The two options lead to very distinct definitions.
6.1 Conditioning the output on the sensitive property
Using a probability distribution to generate the input data means that the ε-indistinguishability
property cannot be expressed between two fixed datasets. Instead, one natural way to express it
is to condition this distribution on some sensitive property. The corresponding notion, noiseless
privacy14 (NPr) was first introduced in [Dua09] and formalized in [BBG+11].
Definition 27 ((Θ, ε)-noiseless privacy [Dua09, BBG+11]). Given a family Θ of probability distri-
bution on D, a mechanism M is (Θ, ε)-noiseless private if for all θ ∈ Θ, all i and all t, t′ ∈ T :
M (D)|D∼θ,D(i)=t ≈εM (D)|D∼θ,D(i)=t′ .
In the original definition, the auxiliary knowledge of the attacker is explicitly pointed out in
an additional parameter. In the case where there is no δ of (ε, 0)-DP, this syntactic add-on is not
necessary [DMKB19], so we omitted it here.
This definition follows naturally from considering the associative view of DP with the strong
adversary assumption, and attempting to relax this assumption. The exact way to model the
adversary’s uncertainty can be changed; for example DP under sampling [LQS11], an instance of
noiseless privacy, models it using random sampling.
This definition was not the first attempt at formalizing an adversary with restricted background
knowledge. In [MGG09], authors define ε-privacy, which represents the background knowledge as
13For details, see Section 11.3.
14Another definition with the same name is introduced in [Far19b], we mention it in Section 11.2.
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a Dirichlet distribution (instead of an arbitrary distribution), whose parameters are interpreted as
characteristics of the attacker. However, this definition imposes a condition on the output, but not
on the mechanism which produced the output. As such, it does not offer strong semantic guarantees
like the other definitions presented in this survey.
6.2 Removing the effect of correlations in the data
In [BGKS13], however, the authors argue that in the presence of correlations in the data, noiseless
privacy can be too strong, and make it impossible to learn global properties of the data. Indeed,
if one record can have an arbitrarily large influence on the rest of the data, conditioning on the
value of this record can lead to very distinguishable outputs even if the mechanism only depends
on global properties of the data. To fix this problem, they propose distributional DP (DistDP),
an alternative definition that that only conditions the data-generating distribution on one possible
value of the target record, and quantifies the information leakage from the mechanism. DistDP
uses a simulator, similarly to variants introduced in Section 8. In [DMKB19], the authors show
that this creates definitional issues in the presence of background knowledge, and introduce causal
DP (CausDP), to capture the same intuition without encountering the same problems.
Definition 28 ((Θ, ε)-causal differential privacy [DMKB19]). Given a family Θ of probability distri-
butions on D, a mechanismM satisfies (Θ, ε)-causal DP (CausDP) if for all probability distributions
θ ∈ Θ, for all i and all t, t′ ∈ T :
M (D)|D∼θ,D(i)=t ≈εM (Di→t′)|D∼θ,D(i)=t .
where Di→t′ is the dataset obtained by changing the i-th record of D into t′.
In this definition, one record is changed after the dataset has been generated, so it does not
affect other records through dependence relationships. These dependence relationships are the only
difference between noiseless privacy and causal DP: when each record is independent of all others,
this definition is equivalent to noiseless privacy [DMKB19].
6.3 Multidimensional definitions
Limiting the background knowledge of an attacker is orthogonal to the dimensions introduced
previously: one can modify the risk model, introduce different neighborhood definitions, or even vary
the privacy parameters across the protected properties along with limiting the attacker background
knowledge.
Combination with Q
Modifying the risk model while limiting the attacker’s background knowledge has interesting con-
sequences. In [DMKB19], the authors show that two options are possible: either consider the
background knowledge as additional information given to the attacker or let the attacker influence
the background knowledge. This distinction between an active and a passive attacker does not mat-
ter if only the worst-case scenario is considered, like in noiseless privacy. However, under different
risk models, such as allowing a small probability of error, they lead to two different definitions.
Both of these definitions use an adapted version of the privacy loss random variable (PLRV)
which explicitly models the attacker background knowledge: the data-generating distribution not
only generates a dataset D but also some auxiliary knowledge B, with values in a set B.
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Definition 29 (PLRV for partial knowledge [DMKB19]). Given a mechanism M, a distribution θ
with values in D ×B, an indice i, and values a, b ∈ T , the PLRV of an output O ∈ O given partial
knowledge Bˆ is:
LM,θi←a/i←b(O, Bˆ) = ln
P(D,B)∼θ
[
M (D) = O
∣∣∣ D(i) = a,B = Bˆ]
P(D,B)∼θ
[
M (D) = O
∣∣∣ D(i) = b, B = Bˆ]
 .
if the three conditions are satisfied:
1. P(D,B)∼θ
[
D(i) = a,B = Bˆ
]
6= 0 and PD∼θ
[
D(i) = b, B = Bˆ
]
6= 0
2. P(D,B)∼θ
[
M (D) = O
∣∣∣ D(i) = a,B = Bˆ] 6= 0
3. P(D,B)∼θ
[
M (D) = O
∣∣∣ D(i) = b, B = Bˆ] 6= 0.
If condition 1 does not hold, then LM,θi←a/i←b(O,B) = 0. Else, if condition 2 does not hold, then
LM,θi←a/i←b(O,B) = −∞. Else, if condition 3 does not hold, then LM,θi←a/i←b(O,B) =∞.
This formalization can then be used to adapt noiseless privacy to a risk model similar to (ε, δ)-
DP, in the case of an active or a passive attacker. The active variant, active partial knowledge
differential privacy (APKDP), quantifies over all possible values of the background knowledge. It
was first introduced in [BBG+11, BGKS13] as noiseless privacy and reformulated in [DMKB19] to
clarify that it implicitly assumes an active attacker.
Definition 30 ((Θ, ε, δ)-active partial knowledge differential privacy [BBG+11, BGKS13, DMKB19]).
Given a family Θ of probability distribution on D × B, a mechanism M is (Θ, ε, δ)-active partial
knowledge DP (APKDP) if for all θ ∈ Θ, all indices i, all t, t′ ∈ T , and all possible values Bˆ of the
background knowledge:
E(D,B)∼θ|D(i)=t,B=Bˆ ,O∼M(D)
[
max
(
0, 1− eε−L
M,θ
i←t/i←t′ (O,Bˆ)
)]
≤ δ.
One specialization of this definition is DP under sampling [LQS11] (DPuS), which mandates DP
to be satisfied after a random sampling is applied to the dataset. The authors use this definition to
show that applying k-anonymity to a randomly sampled dataset provides differential privacy; but
this definition could also be used on its own, to model the attacker’s uncertainty using a randomly
sampled distribution.
The second definition, passive partial knowledge differential privacy [DMKB19] (PPKDP), is
strictly weaker: it models a passive attacker, who cannot choose their background knowledge,
and thus cannot influence the data. In this context, δ does not only apply to the output of the
mechanism, but also to the value of the background knowledge.
Definition 31 ((Θ, ε, δ)-passive partial knowledge differential privacy [DMKB19]). Given a family
Θ of probability distribution on D × B, a mechanism M is (Θ, ε, δ)-passive partial knowledge DP
(PPKDP) if for all θ ∈ Θ, all indices i, and all t, t′ ∈ T :
E(D,B)∼θ|D(i)=t,O∼M(D)
[
max
(
0, 1− eε−L
M,θ
i←t/i←t′ (O,B)
)]
≤ δ.
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Causal DP can also be adapted to a risk model similar to (ε, δ)-DP: in [BD19], authors introduce
a similar notion to causal DP as inherit DP (InhDP), with the small difference that the second
dataset is obtained by removing one record from the first dataset, instead of replacing it; and (ε, δ)-
indistinguishability is used. The authors also define empirical DP [BD19]15, which is identical,
except the empirical distribution is used instead of the actual data distribution, in context where
the latter is unknown. In both cases, the influence of δ on the attacker model is unclear.
Combination with N
Modifying the neighborhood definition is simpler: it is clearly orthogonal to the dimensions intro-
duced in this section. In all definitions of this section so far, the two possibilities between which
the adversary must distinguish are similar to bounded DP. This can easily be changed to choose
other properties to protect from the attacker. This is done in pufferfish privacy [KM12] (PFPr),
which extends the concept of neighboring datasets to neighboring distributions of datasets.
Definition 32 ((Θ,Φ, ε)-pufferfish privacy [KM12]). Given a family of probability distributions Θ
on D, and a family of pairs of predicates Φ on datasets, a mechanismM verifies (Θ,Φ, ε)-pufferfish
privacy if for all distributions θ ∈ Θ and all pairs of predicates (φ1, φ2) ∈ Φ:
M (D)|D∼θ,φ1(D) ≈εM (D)|D∼θ,φ2(D)
Pufferfish privacy extends the concept of neighboring datasets to neighboring distributions of
datasets; starting with a set of data-generating distributions, then conditioning them on sensitive
attributes. The result compares pairs of distributions encompasses noiseless privacy, as well as
other notions. For example, it captures bayesian DP16 (BayDP[LL12]), introduced in [LL12], in
which neighboring records have up to k fixed elements in common and all other elements are
generated randomly from a distribution pi.
The same idea can be formalized by comparing pairs of distributions directly. This is done
in [JB14, KM19b] via distribution privacy (DnPr). The two formalisms are equivalent: an arbitrary
pair of distributions can be seen as a single distribution, conditioned on the value of a secret
parameter. Distribution privacy was instantiated in [GC19] via profile-based DP (PBDP), in which
the attacker tries to distinguish between different probabilistic user profiles.
Further relaxations encompassing the introduced dimensions are probabilistic distribution pri-
vacy [KM19b] (PDnPr), a combination of distribution privacy and probabilistic DP, extended distri-
bution privacy [KM19b] (EDnPr), a combination of distribution privacy and dD-privacy, divergence
distribution privacy [KM19a] (DDnPr), a combination of distribution privacy, and extended diver-
gence distribution privacy [KM19a] (EDDnPr), which combines the latter two definitions. Finally,
divergence distribution privacy with auxiliary inputs [KM19a] considers the setting where the at-
tacker might not know the input probability distribution perfectly.
Definitions of this section are an active area of research; a typical question is to quantify in which
conditions deterministic mechanisms can provide some level privacy. However, they are not used
a lot in practice, likely because of their fragility: if the assumptions about the attacker’s limited
background knowledge are wrong in practice, then the definitions do not provide any guarantee of
protection.
15Another definition with the same name is introduced in [ASV13], we mention it in Section 11.2.
16There are two other notions with the same name: introduced in [YSN15, TF19], we mention them in Section 4
and 5 respectively.
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7 Change in formalism (F)
The definition of differential privacy using ε-indistinguishability compares the distribution of out-
puts given two neighboring inputs. This is not the only way to capture the idea that a attacker
should not be able to gain too much information on the dataset. Other formalisms have been
proposed, which model the attacker more explicitly.
One such formalism reformulates DP in terms of hypothesis testing by limiting the type I and
the type II error of the hypothesis that the output O of a mechanism originates from D1 (instead
of D2). Other formalisms model the attacker explicitly, by formalizing their prior belief as a
probability distribution over all possible datasets. This can be done in two distinct ways. Some
variants consider a specific prior (or family of possible priors) of the attacker, implicitly assuming
a limited background knowledge, like in Section 6. We show that these variants can be interpreted
as changing the prior-posterior bounds of the attacker. Finally, rather than comparing prior and
posterior, a third formalism compares two possible posteriors, quantifying over all possible priors.
Definitions in this section provide a deeper understanding of the guarantees given by differen-
tial privacy, and some of them lead to tighter and simpler theorems on differential privacy, like
composition or amplification results.
7.1 Hypothesis testing
First, differential privacy can be interpreted in terms of hypothesis testing [WZ10, KOV17]. In
this context, an adversary who wants to know whether the output O of a mechanism originates
from D1 (the null hypothesis) or D2 (the alternative hypothesis). Calling S the rejection region,
the probability of false alarm (type I error), when the null hypothesis is true but rejected, is
PFA = P [M (D1) ∈ S]. The probability of missed detection (type II error), when the null hypothesis
is false but retained, is PFA = P [M (D2) ∈ O/S].
It is possible to use these probabilities, to reformulate DP: a mechanism is ε-DP iff for all
S ⊆ O, PFA+eεPMD ≥ 1 and eεPFA+PMD ≥ 1; or equivalently, iff PFA+PMD ≥ 21+eε . Similarly,
a mechanism is (ε, δ)-DP iff (PFA,PMD) = {(α, β) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]|(1− α ≤ eεβ + δ)}.
This hypotheses testing interpretation was used in [DRS19] to define f -differential privacy (f -
DP), which avoids difficulties associated with divergence based relaxations. Specifically, its com-
position theorem is lossless as it provides a computationally tractable tool for analytically approxi-
mating the privacy loss. Moreover, there is a general duality between f -DP and infinite collections
of (ε, δ)-DP guarantees.
Definition 33 (f -differential privacy [DRS19]). Let f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be a convex, continuous, and
non-increasing function such that for all x ∈ [0, 1], f(x) ≤ 1−x. A privacy mechanism M satisfies
f -DP if for all neighboring D1, D2 and all x ∈ [0, 1]:
inf
S
{1− P [M (D2) ∈ S] |P [M (D1) ∈ S] ≤ x} ≥ f(x).
Here, S is the rejection region; and the infimum is the trade-off function between M (D1) and
M (D2). The authors also introduce Gaussian differential privacy (GaussDP) as an instance of
f -differential privacy, which tightly bounds from below the hardness of determining whether an
individual’s data was used in a computation than telling apart two shifted Gaussian distributions.
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7.2 Changing the shape of the prior-posterior bounds
Differential privacy can be interpreted as giving a bound on the posterior of a Bayesian attacker
as a function of their prior. This is exactly the case in indistinguishable privacy (IndPr), an
equivalent reformulation of differential privacy defined in [LXL13]: suppose that the attacker is
trying to distinguish between two options D = D1 and D = D2, where D1 corresponds to the
option “t ∈ D” and D2 to “t /∈ D”. Initially, they associate a certain prior probability P [t ∈ D]
to the first option. When they observe the output of the algorithm, this becomes the posterior
probability P [t ∈ D|M (D) = O]. Combining the definition of ε-DP and the Bayes Theorem, we
have17:
P [t ∈ D|M (D) = O]
P [t /∈ D|M (D) = O] ≤ e
ε · P [t ∈ D]
P [t /∈ D] ⇒ P [t ∈ D|M (D) = O] ≤
eε · P [t ∈ D]
1 + (eε − 1)P [t ∈ D] .
A similar, symmetric lower bound can be obtained. Hence, differential privacy can be interpreted
as bounding the posterior level of certainty of a Bayesian attacker as a function of its prior. We
visualize these bounds on the first two figures of Figure 2.
Some variants of differential privacy use this idea in their formalism, rather than obtaining the
posterior bound as a corollary to the classical DP definition. For example, positive membership
privacy (PMPr) [LQS+13] requires that the posterior does not increase too much compared to the
prior. Like noiseless privacy, it assumes an attacker with limited background knowledge.
Definition 34 ((Θ, ε)-positive membership privacy [LQS+13]). A privacy mechanism M provides
(Θ, ε)-positive membership privacy if for any distribution θ ∈ Θ, any record t ∈ D and any S ⊆ O:
PD∼θ [t ∈ D|M (D) ∈ S] ≤ eεPD∼θ [t ∈ D] and PD∼θ [t /∈ D|M (D) ∈ S] ≥ e−εPD∼θ [t /∈ D] .
Note that this definition is asymmetric: the posterior is bounded from above, but not from below.
In the same paper, the authors also define negative membership privacy (NMPr), which provides the
symmetric lower bound, and membership privacy18 (MPr), which is the conjunction of positive and
negative membership privacy. They show that this definition can represent differential privacy (in its
bounded and unbounded variants), as well as other definitions like differential identifiability [LC12]
and sampling DP [LQS11, LQS12], which we mention in Section 11.2. Bounding the ratio between
prior and posterior by eε is also done in the context of location privacy: in [DGY+18], authors
define ε-DP location obfuscation, which formalizes the same intuition as membership privacy.
A previous attempt at formalizing the same idea was presented in [RHMS09] as adversarial
privacy (AdvPr). This definition is similar to positive membership privacy, except only the first
relation is used, and there is a small additive δ as in approximate DP. We visualize the corresponding
bounds on the third figure of Figure 2.
Definition 35 ((Θ, ε, δ)-adversarial privacy [RHMS09]). An algorithm M is (Θ, ε, δ)-adversarial
private if for all S ⊆ O, tuples t, and distributions θ ∈ Θ:
PD∼θ [t ∈ D|M (D) ∈ S] ≤ eε · PD∼θ [t ∈ D] + δ.
17Note that the original formalization used in [LXL13] was more abstract, and it used polynomially bounded
adversaries what we introduce in Section 9.
18Another definition with the same name is introduced in [SDO+19], we mention it in Section 11.1.
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Adversarial privacy (without δ) was also redefined in [WXH17] as information privacy19.
Finally, aposteriori noiseless privacy (ANPr) is a similar variant of noiseless privacy introduced
in [BBG+11]; the corresponding bounds can be seen on the last figure of Figure 2.
Definition 36 ((Θ, ε)-aposteriori noiseless privacy [BBG+11]). A mechanism M is said to be
(Θ, ε)-aposteriori noiseless private (ANPr) if for all θ ∈ Θ, all S ⊆ O and all i:
D(i)|D∼θ,M(D)∈S ≈ε D(i)|D∼θ.
We visualize the prior/posterior bounds for these various definitions in Figure 2.
Figure 2: From left to right, using ε = ln 3: posterior-prior bounds in differential privacy, positive
membership privacy, adversarial privacy (with δ = 0.05) and aposteriori noiseless privacy.
7.3 Comparing two posteriors
In [KS14], the authors propose an approach that captures an intuitive idea proposed by Dwork
in [Dwo06]: “any conclusions drawn from the output of a private algorithm must be similar whether
or not an individual’s data is present in the input or not”. They define semantic privacy (SemPr):
instead of comparing the posterior with the prior belief like in DP, this bounds the difference
between two posterior belief distributions, depending on which dataset was secretly chosen. The
distance chosen to represent the idea that those two posterior belief distributions are close is the
statistical distance. One important difference between the definitions in the previous subsection is
that semantic privacy quantifies over all possible priors: like in DP, the attacker is assumed to have
arbitrary background knowledge.
Definition 37 (ε-semantic privacy [GKS08, KS14]). A mechanism M is ε-semantically private if
for any distribution over datasets θ, any index i, any S ⊆ O, and any set of datasets X ⊆ D:
|PD∼θ [D ∈ X | M (D) ∈ S]− PD∼θ [D ∈ X | M (D−i) ∈ S]| ≤ ε.
A couple of other definitions also compare posteriors directly: inferential privacy [GK16] is
a reformulation of noiseless privacy, and range-bounded privacy [DR19] (RBPr) requires that two
different values of the PLRV are close to each other (instead of being between centered aroud zero
like in ε-DP). It is equivalent to ε-DP up to a change in parameters, and is used as a technical tool
to prove composition results.
19Another definition with the same name is introduced in [dPCF12], we mention it later in this section.
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7.4 Multidimensional definitions
Definitions that limit the background knowledge of the adversary explicitly formulate it as a proba-
bility distribution. As such, they are natural candidates for Bayesian reformulations. In [WXH17],
the authors introduce identity DP, which is an equivalent Bayesian reformulation of noiseless pri-
vacy.
Another example is inference-based causal DP [DMKB19], similar to aposteriori noiseless DP,
except it uses causal DP instead of noiseless DP.
Definition 38 ((Θ, ε)-inference-based causal differential privacy [DMKB19]). Given a family Θ of
probability distribution on D, a mechanism M satisfies (Θ, ε)-inference-based distributional DP if
(IBCDP) for all probability distributions θ ∈ Θ, for all i, all a, b ∈ T and all outputs O:
D(i)|D∼θ,M(D)=O ≈ε D(i)|D∼θ,M(Di→b)=O.
where Di→b is the dataset obtained by changing the i-th record of D into b.
Further, it is possible to consider different definitions of neighborhood. In [dPCF12], authors
introduce information privacy20 (InfPr), which can be seen as a posteriori noiseless privacy com-
bined with free lunch privacy: rather than only considering the knowledge gain of the adversary
on one particular user, it considers its knowledge gain about any possible group of values of the
dataset.
Definition 39 ((Θ, ε)-information privacy [dPCF12]). A mechanismM satisfies (Θ, ε)-information
privacy if for all probability distributions θ ∈ Θ, all D ∈ D and all O ∈ O, D|D∼θ ≈ε D|D∼θ,M(D)=O.
The authors further prove that if Θ contains a distribution whose support is D, then (Θ, ε)-InfPr
implies 2ε-DP.
Apart from the hypothesis testing reformulations, that can be used to improve composition and
amplification results, the definitions in this section mostly appear in theoretical research papers,
to provide a deeper understanding of guarantees offered by DP and its alternatives. They do not
seem to be used in practical applications.
8 Relativization of the knowledge gain (R)
A differentially private mechanism does not reveal more than a bounded amount of probabilistic
information about a user. This view does not explicitly take into account other ways information
can leak, like side-channel functions or knowledge about the structure of a social network. We found
two approaches that attempt to include such auxiliary functions in DP variants. One possibility is
to weaken DP by allowing a certain amount of leakage; another option is to explicitly forbid the
mechanism to reveal more than another function, considered to be safe for release.
8.1 Taking into account auxiliary leakage function
In [LPR20], authors define bounded leakage DP, which quantifies the privacy that is maintained
by a mechanism despite bounded, additional leakage of information by some leakage function.
Interestingly, this leakage function P shares the randomness of the privacy mechanism: it can, for
20 Another definition with the same name is introduced in [WXH17], we mention it earlier in this section.
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example, capture side-channel leakage from the mechanism’s execution. In the formal definition
of this DP variant, the randomness is explicit : the privacy mechanism and the leakage takes the
random bits r ∈ {0, 1}∗ as an additional parameter.
Definition 40 ((P, ε, δ)-bounded leakage differential privacy [LPR20]). Let P : D×{0, 1}∗ be a leak-
age function. A privacy mechanism M is (P, ε, δ)-bounded leakage differentially private (BLDP) if
for all pairs of neighboring datasets D1 and D2, all outputs OP of P such that P [P (D1, r) = OP ] 6= 0
and P [P (D2, r) = OP ] 6= 0, and all sets of outputs S ⊆ O:
P [M (D1, r) ∈ S | P (D1, r) = OP ] ≤ eε · P [M (D2, r) ∈ S | P (D2, r) = OP ] + δ
where the randomness is taken over the random bits r.
As expected, if there is no leakage (P is a constant function), this is simply (ε, δ)-DP. The
authors also show that it is closed for post-processing and composable. Furthermore, if the privacy
mechanism is independent from the leakage function, it is strictly weaker than differential privacy.
8.2 Borrowing concepts from zero-knowledge proofs
When using the associative interpretation with the independence assumption, it is unclear how to
adapt DP to correlated datasets like social networks: data about someone’s friends might reveal
sensitive information about this person. The causal interpretation of DP does not suffer from this
problem, but how to adapt the associative view to such correlated contexts? Changing the definition
of the neighborhood is one possibility (see Section 4.1), but it requires knowing in advance the
exact impact of someone on other records. A more robust option is to impose that the information
released does not contain more information than the result of some predefined algorithms on the
data, without the individual in question. The method for formalizing this intuition borrows ideas
from zero-knowledge proofs [GMR89].
Instead of imposing that the result of the mechanism is roughly the same on neighboring datasets
D1 and D2, the intuition is to impose that the result of the mechanism on D1 can be simulated
using only some information about D2. The corresponding definition, called zero-knowledge privacy
and introduced in [GLP11], captures the idea that the mechanism does not leak more information
on a given target than a certain class of aggregate metrics. This class, called model of aggregate
information in [GLP11], is formalized by a family of (possibly randomized) family of algorithms
Agg.
Definition 41 ((Agg, ε)-zero-knowledge privacy [GLP11]). Let Agg be a family of (possibly ran-
domized) algorithms agg. A privacy mechanism M is (Agg, ε)-zero-knowledge private (ZKPr) if
there exists an algorithm agg ∈ Agg and a simulator Sim such as for all datasets D and indices i,
M (D) ≈ε Sim (agg (D−i)).
In [GLP11], authors show that (Agg, ε)-ZKPr implies 2ε-DP for any Agg, while ε-DP implies
(Agg, ε)-ZKPr if the identity function is in Agg. This is yet another way to formalize the intuition
that differential privacy protects against attackers who have full background knowledge.
8.3 Multidimensional definitions
Using a simulator allows making statements of the type “this mechanism does not leak more infor-
mation on a given target than a certain class of aggregate metrics”. Similarly to noiseless privacy, it
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is possible to explicitly limit the attacker’s background knowledge using a data-generating probabil-
ity distribution, as well as vary the neighborhood definitions to protect other types of information
than the presence and characteristics of individuals. This is done in [BGKS13] as coupled-worlds
privacy (CWPr), a generalization of distributional DP, where a family of functions priv represents
the protected attribute.
Definition 42 ((Θ,Γ, ε)-coupled-worlds privacy [BGKS13]). Let Γ be a family of pairs of functions
(agg, priv). A mechanism M satisfies (Θ,Γ, ε)-coupled-worlds privacy if there is a simulator Sim
such that for all distributions θ ∈ Θ, all (agg, priv) ∈ Γ, and all possible values p:
M (D)|D∼θ,priv(D)=p ≈ε Sim(agg (D))|D∼θ,priv(D)=p
A special case of coupled-worlds privacy is also introduced in [BGKS13] as distributional DP,
already mentioned in Section 6: each function priv captures the value of a single record, and the
corresponding function agg outputs all other records.
Coupled-worlds privcay is a good example of combining variants from different dimensions: it
changes several aspects of the original definition according to from N, B and R. Moreover, Q and
F can easily be integrated with this definition by using (ε, δ)-indistinguishability with a Bayesian
reformulation. This is done explicitly in inference-based coupled-worlds privacy [BGKS13]; the same
paper also introduces inference-based distributional differential privacy (IBDDP).
Definition 43 ((Θ,Γ, ε, δ)-inference-based coupled-worlds privacy [BGKS13]). Given a family Θ
of probability distributions on D ×B, and a family Γ of pairs of functions (agg, priv), a mechanism
M satisfies (Θ,Γ, ε, δ)-inference-based coupled-worlds privacy (IBCWPr) if there is a simulator Sim
such that for all distributions θ ∈ Θ, and all (agg, priv) ∈ Γ:
priv (D)|(D,B)∼θ,M(D)=O,B=Bˆ ≈(ε,δ) priv (D)|(D,B)∼θ,Sim(agg(D))=O,B=Bˆ
with probability at least 1− δ over the choice of O and Bˆ.
Random DP was also combined with an idea similar to ZKPr: in [BF16], the authors introduce
typical stability (TypSt), which combines random DP with approximate DP, except that rather
using (ε, δ)-indistinguishability between two outputs of the mechanism, it uses a simulator that
only knows data-generating distribution.
Definition 44 ((Θ, γ, ε, δ)-typical stability [BF16]). Given a family Θ of probability distributions on
D, a mechanismM satisfies (Θ, γ, ε, δ)-typical stability (TypSt) if for all distributions θ ∈ Θ, there is
a simulator Sim such that with probability at least 1−γ over the choice of D ∼ θ,M (D) ≈ε,δ Sim(θ).
In the same paper, the authors introduce a variant of the same definition with the same
name, which compares two outputs of the mechanism; this is essentially a combination between
DlPr[Rot10, BLR13] and approximate DP.
We did not find any evidence that the variants and extensions of this section are used outside
of theoretical papers exploring the guarantees they provide.
9 Computational power (C)
The ε-indistinguishability property in DP is information-theoretic: the attacker is implicitly as-
sumed to have infinite computing power. This is unrealistic in practice, so it is natural to consider
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definitions where the attacker only has polynomial computing power. Changing this assumption
leads to weaker data privacy definitions. In [MPRV09], two approaches have been proposed to for-
malize this idea: either modeling the distinguisher explicitly as a polynomial Turing machine, either
allow a mechanism not to be technically differentially private, as long as one cannot distinguish it
from a truly differentially private one.
Using a polynomial distinguisher on the output
The attacker is not explicit in the formalization of DP based on ε-indistinguishability. It is possible
change the definition to make this attacker explicit: model it as a distinguisher, who tries to guess
whether a given output O comes from a dataset D1 or its neighbor D2. In doing so, it becomes
straightforward to require this attacker to be computationally bounded: simply model it as a
probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. In [MPRV09], the authors introduce IndCDP, short
for Indistinguishability-based Computational DP.
Definition 45 (εκ-IndCDP [MPRV09]). A family (Mκ)κ∈N of privacy mechanisms Mκ provides
εκ-IndCDP if there exists a negligible function neg such that for all non-uniform probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machines Ω (the distinguisher), all polynomials p(·), all sufficiently large
κ ∈ N, and all datasets D1, D2 ∈ D of size at most p(κ) that differ only one one record:
P [Ω(M (D1)) = 1] ≤ eεκ · P [Ω(M (D2)) = 1] + neg (κ)
where neg is a function that converges to zero asymptotically faster than the reciprocal of any
polynomial.
This definition can also be expressed using the authors define differential indistinguishability, a
notion defined in [BKMR14] that adapts ε-indistinguishability to a polynomially bounded attacker.
Using a polynomial distinguisher on the mechanism
Another natural option is to require that the mechanism “looks like” a truly differentially pri-
vate mechanism, at least to a computationally bounded distinguisher. In [MPRV09], the authors
introduce SimCDP, short for Simulation-based Computational DP.
Definition 46 (εκ-SimCDP [MPRV09]). A family (Mκ)κ∈N of privacy mechanisms Mκ provides
εκ-SimCDP if there exists a family (M′κ)κ∈N of εκ-DP and a negligible function neg such that for all
non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines Ω, all polynomials p(·), all sufficiently
large κ ∈ N, and all datasets D ∈ D of size at most p(κ):
P [Ω(M (D)) = 1]− P [Ω(M′(D)) = 1] ≤ neg (κ)
where neg is a function that converges to zero asymptotically faster than the reciprocal of any
polynomial.
In [MPRV09], the authors show that εκ-SimCDP implies εκ-IndCDP.
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9.1 Multidimensional definitions
IndCDP has been adapted to different settings, and extended to arbitrary neighborhood relation-
ships. In output constrained DP (OCDP), introduced in [HMFS17], the setting is a two-party
computation, each party can have its own set of privacy parameters (εA, εB , δA, and δB—the δ
parameters correspond to the neg (κ) term in IndCDP), and the neighborhood relationship is de-
termined by a function f . The authors also propose DP for Record Linkage (DPRL), an instance
of OCDP that uses for a specific function f that captures the need to protect non-matching records
during the execution of a private record linkage protocol.
Some DP variants which explicitly model an adversary with a simulator can relatively easily
be adapted to model a computationally bounded adversary, simply by imposing that the simulator
must be polynomial. This is done explicitly in [GLP11], where the authors define computational
zero-knowledge privacy (CZKPr), which could also be adapted to e.g., the two coupled-worlds
privacy definitions as well.
Further, although we have not seen this done in practice in existing literature, the idea be-
hind SimCDP can in principle be adapted to any other definition: rather than requiring that a
given definition holds in an information-theoretic fashion, it should be possible to require that the
mechanism “looks like” a mechanism which genuinely satisfies the definition.
Limiting the computational power of the attacker is a reasonable assumption, but for a large
class of queries, it cannot provide significant benefits over classical DP in the typical client-server
setting [GKY11]. Thus, existing work using it focuses on multi-party settings [BHE+18].
10 Summarizing table
In this section we summarize the results from the previous 7 sections into a table where we list the
known relations and show the properties with either referring to the original proof or creating a
novel one.
In Table 3 we list the differential privacy variants and extensions introduced in this work.
For each, we specify their name, parameters and where they were introduced (column 1), which
dimensions they belong to (column 2), which axioms they satisfy (column 3, post-processing on
the left and convexity on the right), whether they are composable (column 4) and how they relate
to other differential privacy notions (column 5). We do not list definitions whose only difference
is that they apply DP to other types of input, like those from Section 4.3, or geolocation-specific
definitions.
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Name & References Dimensions18
Axioms
Cp.13 Relations
P.P.11 Cv.12
(ε, δ)-DP, or (ε, δ)-approximate DP [DKM+06]
Q X2 X2 X8 (ε, δ)-DP ⊃≺ ε-DP
also known as max-KL stability [BNS+16]
(ε, δ)-probabilistic DP [MKA+08, Mei18]
Q 71 73 X8 (ε, δ)-DP ∼ (ε, δ)-ProDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
also known as (ε, δ)-DP in distribution [CO15]
(ε, δa, δp)-Relaxed DP [ZQZ+15] Q 71 73 X8 (ε, δp)-ProDP ⊂ (ε, δa, δp)-RelDP ⊃≺ (ε, δa)-DP
35
Name & References Dimensions18
Axioms
Cp.13 Relations
P.P.11 Cv.12
ε-Kullback-Leiber Pr [BD14, CY16] Q X2 X2 X8 (ε, δ)-DP ≺ ε-KLPr ≺ ε-DP
(α, ε)-Re´nyi DP [Mir17] Q X2 X2 X8 ε-KLPr ⊂≺ (α, ε)-RenyiDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
binary-|χ|α DP [WBK18] Q ? ? ? b-|χ|α DP  (ε, δ)-DP
tenary-|χ|α DP [WBK18] Q ? ? ? t-|χ|α DP  (ε, δ)-DP
ε-total variation Pr [BD14] Q ? ? ? ε-TVPr ⊂ b-|χ|α DP
ε-quantum DP [Col16] Q ? ? ?
ε-mutual-information DP [CY16] Q X2 X2 X8 (ε, δ)-DP ≺ ε-MIDP ≺ ε-KLPr
(µ, τ)-mean concentrated DP [DR16] Q 71 ? X8 (ε, δ)-DP ≺ (µ, τ)-mCoDP ≺ ε-DP
(ξ, ρ)-zero concentrated DP [BS16] Q X2 X2 X8 (ξ, ρ)-zCoDP ∼ (µ, τ)-mCoDP
(ξ, ρ, δ)-approximate CoDP [BS16] Q 72 ? X8 (ε, δ)-DP  (ξ, ρ, δ)-ACoDP ⊃≺ (ξ, ρ)-zCoDP
(ξ, ρ, ω)-bounded CoDP [BS16] Q X2 X2 X8 (ξ, ρ, ω)-bCoDP ⊃≺ (ξ, ρ)-zCoDP
(η, τ)-truncated CoDP [Col16] Q X2 X2 X8 (η, τ)-tCoDP[Col16] ∼ ε-DP
(ρ, ω)-truncated CoDP [BDRS18] Q X2 X2 X8 (ρ, ω)-tCoDP[BDRS18] ⊂≺ (ξ, ρ, ω)-bCoDP
(f, ε)-divergence DP [BD14] Q X2 X2 ? (f, ε)-DivDP ⊃ most definitions in Q
(fk, ε)-divergence DP [DR18] Q X2 X2 ? (fk, ε)-DivDP ⊂ (f, ε)-DivDP
(H, f, ε)-capacity bounded DP [CIM19] Q X2 X2 ? (H, f, ε)-CBDP ⊂≺ (f, ε)-DivDP
ε-unbounded DP [KM11] N X1 X1 X9 ε-DP ∼ ε-uBoDP ⊂∼ (c, ε)-GrDP
ε-bounded DP [KM11]
N X1 X1 X9 ε-BoDP ≺ ε-DP
also known as per-person DP [FMTT18]
ε-attribute/bit DP [KM11] N X1 X1 X9 ε-BitDP ≺ ε-AttDP ≺ ε-BoDP
ε-element DP [ADJ19] N X1 X1 X9 ε-ELDP ≺ ε-DP
(P, ε)-one-sided DP [DKH+17] N X1 X1 X9 (P, ε)-OnSDP ⊃≺ ε-BoDP
(N, k, ε)-sensitive privacy [APV19] N X1 X1 X9 (N, k, ε)-SenPr ⊂ ε-(P, ε)-OnSDP
(P, ε)-anomaly-restricted DP [BSW18] N X1 X1 X9 (P, ε)-ARDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
(c, ε)-group DP [Dwo08]
N X1 X1 X9 (c, ε)-GrDP ⊃∼ ε-DP
also known as DP under correlation [CFYD14]
(R, c, ε)-dependent DP [LCM16] N X1 X1 X9 (R, c, ε)-DepDP ⊃ (c, ε)-GrDP
(A, ε)-bayesian DP [YSN15] N X1 X1 X9 (A, ε)-BayDP[YSN15] ⊃ (R, c, ε)-DepDP
(A, ε)-correlated DP [WDN17, WWK+17] N X1 X1 X9 (A, ε)-CorDP ⊂ (A, ε)-BayDP[YSN15]
(A, ε)-prior DP [LRYY19] N X1 X1 X9 (A, ε)-PriDP ⊃ (A, ε)-BayDP[YSN15]
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Axioms
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P.P.11 Cv.12
ε-free lunch Pr [KM11] N X1 X1 X9 ε-FLPr  all definitions in N
(D, ε)-individual DP [SCDFSM17]
N X1 X1 X9 (D, ε)-IndDP ≺ ε-DP
also known as conditioned DP [CH16]
(D, t, ε)-per-instance DP [Wan17] N X1 X1 X9 (D, t, ε)-PIDP ≺ (D, ε)-IndDP
(R, ε)-generic DP [KM11, FC14] N X1 X1 X9 (R, ε)-GcDP[KM11] ⊃ most definitions in N
(d,∆, ε)-constrained DP [ZLW09]
also known as adjacent DP [KM18] N X1 X1 X9 (d,∆, ε)-ConsDP ∼ (R, ε)-GcDP
and DP under a neighborhood [FC14]
(d,∆, SD, ε)-distributional Pr [ZLW09] N X1 X1 X9 (d,∆, SD, ε)-DlPr[ZLW09] ⊂ (R, ε)-GcDP
(f, ε)-sensitivity-induced DP [RA17] N X1 X1 X9 ε-SIDP ⊂ (R, ε)-GcDP(IQ, ε)-induced-neighbors DP [KM11] N X1 X1 X9 (IQ, ε)-INDP ⊂ (R, ε)-GcDP(
G, IQ, ε
)
-blowfish Pr [HMD14, HMD15] N X1 X1 X9 (G, IQ, ε)-BFPr ⊂ (R, ε)-GcDP ⊃≺ (IQ, ε)-INDP
ε-adjacency-relation div. DP [KM19a] Q,N X2,1 X2,1 ? (R, ε)-GcDP[KM11] ⊂ (R, f, ε)-ARDDP ⊃ (f, ε)-DivDP
Ψ-personalized DP
[NAD14, JYC15, ESS15, GR15, LWS15] V X4 X4 X9 Ψ-PerDP ⊃ ε-DP
also known as heterogeneous DP [AGK15]
Ψ-tailored DP [LP15] V X4 X4 X9 Ψ-TaiDP ⊃ Ψ-PerDP
ε(·)-outlier Pr [LP15] V X4 X4 X9 ε(·)-OutPr ⊂ Ψ-TaiDP
(k, ε)-simple-outlier Pr [LP15] V X4 X4 X9 (k, ε)-SOPr ⊂ Ψ-OutPr
(k, ε)-simple outlier DP [LP15] V X4 X4 X9 ε-DP  (k, ε)-SODP ⊂ Ψ-OutPr
(k, ε)-staircase outlier DP [LP15] V X4 X4 X9 (k, ε)-SCODP ⊂ Ψ-OutPr
(ε, p, r)-Pareto DP [LP15] V X4 X4 X9 (ε, p, r)-ParDP ⊂ Ψ-TaiDP
(pi, γ, ε)-random DP [HRW11] V ? 75 X8 (pi, γ, ε)-RanDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
(pi, γ, ε)-predictive DP [Hal12]
V ? ? ? (pi, γ, ε)-RanDP ≺ (pi, γ, ε)-PredDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
also known as model-specific DP [McC15]
(θ, γ, ε)-generalized DP [DJRT13] V ? ? ? (θ, γ, ε)-GdDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
dD-Pr [CABP13]
N,V X4 X4 X9 ε-DP ⊂ dD-Pr
also known as extended DP [KM19b]
ε-weighted DP [PGM14] N,V X4 X4 X9 ε-WeiDP ⊂ dD-Pr
(dD, ε)-smooth DP [BD14] N,V X4 X4 X9 (dD, ε)-SmoDP ∼ dD-Pr
(dD, ε)-earth mover’s Pr [FDM19] N,V X4 X4 X9 (dD, ε)-EMDP ⊂ dD-Pr
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Axioms
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P.P.11 Cv.12
(pi, ε, γ)-DP on δ location set [XX15] N,V X4 X4 X9 (pi, ε, γ)-LocSetDP
(ε, γ)-distributional Pr [ZLW09, Rot10] N,V ? ? ? ε-FLPr ⊂ (ε, γ)-DlPr[Rot10, BLR13]
(ε(·), δ(·))-endogenous DP [Kre19] Q,V X4 X4 X9 (ε, δ)-DP ⊂ (ε(·), δ(·))-EndDP ⊃≺ Ψ-PerDP
(pi, ε, δ)-weak Bayesian DP [TF19] Q,V X1 ? X9 (ε, δ)-DP  (pi, ε, δ)-WBDP ≺ (pi, γ, ε)-RanDP
(Θ, ε)-on average KL Pr [WLF16, FS18]
Q,V X2,1 ? ?16 ε-KLPr  (Θ, ε)-avgKLPr ≺ (pi, γ, ε)-RanDP
also known as average leave-one-out KL stability [FS18]
(pi, ε, δ)-Bayesian DP [TF19] Q,V X1 75 X9 (ε, δ)-ProDP  (pi, ε, δ)-BayDP[TF19] ≺ (pi, γ, ε)-RanDP
(θ, ε, δ)-privacy at risk [DBB20] Q,V X1 75 X9 (ε, δ)-ProDP  (θ, ε, δ)-PAR ≺ (pi, γ, ε)-RanDP
(dD, ε, δ)-pseudo-metric DP [DNM+13] Q,N,V ? ? X8 (ε, δ)-DP ⊂ (dD, ε, δ)-PsDP ⊃≺ dD-Pr
(f, d, ε)-extended divergence DP [KM19a] Q,N,V X4 X4 ? dD-Pr ⊂ (f, d, ε)-EDivDP ⊃ (f, ε)-Div DP
(R,M)-generic DP [KL10] Q,N,V X1 X1 ? (R,M)-GcDP[KL10] ⊃ (ε, δ)-DP
(R, q)-abstract DP [KL10] Q,N,V 71 71 ? (R, q)-AbsDP ⊃ (R,M)-GcDP[KL10]
(Θ, ε)-noiseless Pr [Dua09, BBG+11, GK16, WXH17] B X1 X1 710 ε-DP ⊂ (Θ, ε)-NPr
(Θ, ε)-causal DP [DMKB19] B X1 X1 710 (Θ, ε)-CausDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
(β, ε)-DP under sampling [LQS11] Q,B X1 X1 710 (Θ, ε)-NPr ⊃ (β, ε)-SamDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
(Θ, ε, δ)-active PK DP [BBG+11, BGKS13, DMKB19] Q,B X1 X1 710 (Θ, ε, δ)-APKDP ⊃≺ (Θ, ε)-NPr
(Θ, ε, δ)-passive PK DP [DMKB19] Q,B X1 X1 710 (Θ, ε, δ)-APKDP  (Θ, ε, δ)-PPKDP ⊃≺ (Θ, ε)-NPr
(Θ,Φ, ε)-pufferfish Pr [KM12, JB14, KM19b] N,B X1 X1 710 (Θ, ε)-NPr ⊂ (Θ,Φ, ε)-PFPr ⊃ (R, ε)-GcDP
(pi, k, ε)-Bayesian DP [LL12] N,B X1 X1 710 BayDP[LL12] ⊂ (Θ,Φ, ε)-PFPr
(Θ, ε, δ)-distribution Pr [KM19b] Q,N,B X4 X4 710 (Θ, ε, δ)-DnPr ⊃ (Θ, ε, δ)-APKDP
(Θ, ε, δ)-profile-based DP [GC19] Q,N,B X4 X4 710 (Θ, ε, δ)-PBDP ⊂ (Θ, ε, δ)-DnPr
(Θ, ε, δ)-probabilistic DnPr [KM19b] Q,N,B 71 73 710 ε-ProDP ⊂ (Θ, ε, δ)-PDnPr ⊃ (Θ, ε)-DnPr
(f,Θ, ε)-divergence DnPr [KM19a] Q,N,B X4 X4 710 (f, ε)-DP ⊂ (f,Θ, ε)-DDnPr ⊃ (Θ, ε)-DnPr
(d,Θ, ε)-extended DnPr [KM19b] N,V,B X4 X4 710 dD-Pr ⊂ (d,Θ, ε)-EDnPr ⊃ (Θ, ε)-DnPr
(d, f,Θ, ε)-ext. div. DnPr [KM19a] Q,N,V,B X4 X4 710 (f,Θ, ε)-DDPr ⊂ (d, f,Θ, ε)-EDDnPr ⊃ (d,Θ, ε)-EDnPr
ε-indistinguishable Pr [LXL13] F X14 X14 X14 ε-IndPr ∼ ε-DP
f -DP [DRS19] Q,F X1 ? X1 f-DP ⊃ (ε, δ)-DP
Gaussian DP [DRS19] Q,F X1 ? X1 GaussDP ⊂ f -Pr
(Θ, ε)-positive membership Pr [LQS+13] B,F X6 X6 710 (Θ, ε)-PMPr ⊃ ε-BoDP
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(Θ, ε)-negative membership Pr [LQS+13] B,F X6 X6 710 (Θ, ε)-NMPr ⊃ ε-BoDP
(Θ, ε)-membership Pr [LQS+13] B,F X6 X6 710 (Θ, ε)-PMPr ≺ (Θ, ε)-MPr  (Θ, ε)-NMPr
(Θ, ε, δ)-adversarial Pr [RHMS09, WXH17]
Q,B,F X6 X6 710 (ε, δ)-DP ⊂ (Θ, ε, δ)-AdvPr ≺ (Θ, ε)-PMPr
also known as information privacy [WXH17]
(Θ, ε)-aposteriori noiseless Pr [BBG+11] B,F X6 X6 ? (Θ, ε)-ANPr ∼ (Θ, ε)-NPr
ε-semantic Pr [GKS08, KS14] F ? ? ? ε-SemPr ∼ ε-DP
ε-range-bounded Pr [DR19] F ? ? ? ε-RBPr ∼ ε-DP
(Θ, ε)-inference-based causal DP [DMKB19] B,F ? ? ? (Θ, ε)-IBCDP ∼ (Θ, ε)-CausDP
(Θ, ε)-information Pr [dPCF12] N,B,F ? ? ? (Θ, ε)-InfPr  ε-DP
(Agg, ε)-zero-knowledge Pr [GLP11] R X1 X1 ?16 (Agg, ε)-ZKPr  ε-DP
(P, ε, δ)-bounded leakage DP [LPR20] Q,R X1 X1 X8 (P, ε, δ)-BLDP ⊃ (ε, δ)-DP
(Θ,Γ, ε)-coupled-worlds Pr [BGKS13] N,B,R X1 X1 74 (Θ,Γ, ε)-CWPr ⊃ ε-DP
(Θ, ε)-distributional DP [BGKS13] N,B,R X1 X1 74 (Θ,Γ, ε)-CWPr ⊃ (Θ, ε)-DistDP ⊃≺ ε-DP
(Θ,Γ, ε, δ)-inference-based CW Pr [BGKS13] Q,N,B,F,R ? ? 74 (Θ,Γ, ε, δ)-IBCWPr  (Θ,Γ, ε)-CWPr
(Θ,Γ, ε, δ)-inference-based DistDP [BGKS13] Q,N,B,F,R ? ? 74 (Θ, ε)-DDP  (Θ,Γ, ε, δ)-IBDDP ⊂ (Θ,Γ, ε, δ)-IBCWPr
(Θ, ε, γ, δ)-typical stability [BF16] Q,V,R X1 ? X8
εκ-SIM-computational DP [MPRV09] C X7 X7 X17 εκ-SimCDP ≺ ε-DP
εκ-IND-computational DP [MPRV09] C X7 X7 X17 εκ-IndCDP ≺ εκ-SimCDP
(ε, δ)-DP for Record Linkage [HMFS17] C X7 X7 X17 (ε, δ)-RLDP ⊂ (ε, δ, f)-OCDP
(ε, δ, f)-output constrained DP [HMFS17] N,C X7 X7 X17 (ε, δ, f)-OCDP ⊃ εκ-IndCDP
(Agg, ε)-computational ZK Pr [GLP11] R,C X7 X7 ? (Agg, ε)-CZKPr ⊃≺ (Agg, ε)-ZKPr
Table 3: Summary of variants/extensions of DP representing the main options
in each combination of dimensions.
1. See Proposition 1.
2. See Proposition 2.
3. See Proposition 3.
4. See Proposition 4.
5. See Proposition 5.
6. See Proposition 6.
7. See Proposition 7.
8. See Proposition 8.
9. See Proposition 9.
10. See Proposition 10.
11. Post-processing
12. Convexity
13. Composition
14. Follows directly from its
equivalence with ε-DP.
15. A modified definition was
presented in [KM12] which
is an instance of PF Pr.
16. A proof for a restricted sce-
nario appears in the paper
introducing the definition.
17. This claim appears
in [Mir17], its proof is
in the unpublished full
version.
18. Abbreviations used for di-
mensions:
• Q: Quantification of
privacy loss
• N: Neighborhood
definition
• V: Variation of pri-
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vacy loss
• B: Background
knowledge
• F: Formalism of pri-
vacy loss
• R: Relativization of
knowledge gain
• C: Computational
power
10.1 Proofs of properties
Axioms
Proposition 1 (Existing results).
1. ProDP, ACoDP, and mCoDP do not satisfy the post-processing axiom [Mei18, BS16].
2. AbsDP satisfies neither privacy axiom, while GlDP satisfies both [KL10, KM12]21.
3. WBDP satisfies the post-processing axiom [TF19].
4. TypSt satisfies the post-processing axiom [BF16].
5. Gauss DP satisfies the post-processing axiom [DRS19].
6. PFPr satisfy both privacy axioms [KM12].
7. CWPr satisfy both privacy axioms 22 [BGKS13].
8. APKDP and PPKDP satisfy both privacy axioms [DMKB19].
9. BLDP satisfies both privacy axioms [LPR20].
Proposition 2. All instantiations of DivDP satisfy both privacy axioms. In particular, approximate
DP, MIDP, KLPr, RenDP, and zCoDP satisfy both axioms.
Proof. The post-processing axiom follows directly from the monotonicity property of the f -divergence.
The convexity axiom follows directly from the joint convexity property of the f -divergence.
Proposition 3. ProDP and ACoDP do not satisfy the convexity axiom.
Proof. Consider the following mechanisms M1 and M2, with input and output in {0, 1}.
• M1 (0) = 0, M1 (1) = 1 with probability δ, and M1 (1) = 0 with probability 1− δ.
• M2 (0) =M2 (1) = 1.
Both mechanisms are
(
1
1−δ , δ
)
-ProDP. Now, consider the mechanism M which applies M1 with
probability 1−2δ andM2 with probability 2δ. M is a convex combination ofM1 andM2, but the
reader can verify that it is not
(
1
1−δ , δ
)
-ProDP. The result for (ξ, ρ, δ)-ACoDP is a direct corollary,
since is is equivalent to (ξ, δ)-ProDP when ρ = 0.
Proposition 4. dD-Pr satisfies both privacy axioms. Further, EDivDP also satisfies both privacy
axioms.
21As an immediate corollary, all definitions which combine notions in N and NPr also satisfy both axioms.
22As an immediate corollary, DistDP and ZKPr also satisfy both axioms.
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Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 for PFPr (Appendix B in [KM12]) is a proof by case analysis on
every possible protected property. The fact that ε is the same for every protected property has no
influence on the proof, so we can directly adapt the proof to dD-Pr, and its combination with PFPr.
Similarly, the proof can be extended to arbitrary divergence functions, like in Proposition 2.
Proposition 5. RanDP does not satisfy the convexity axiom.
Proof. Let pi be the uniform distribution on {0, 1}, let D1 be generated by picking 10 records
according to pi, and D2 by flipping one record at random. LetM0 return 0 if all records are 0, and
⊥ otherwise. Let M1 return 1 if all records are 1, and ⊥ otherwise.
Note that both mechanisms are (pi, 2−9, 0)-RanDP. Indeed, M0 will only return 0 for D1 with
probability 2−10, and for D2 with probability 2−10 (if D1 only has one 1, which happens with
probability 10 · 2−10, and this record is flipped, which happens with probability 0.1). In both cases,
M0 will return ⊥ for the other database; which will be a distinguishing event. Otherwise,M0 will
return τ for both databases, so M (D1) ≈0 M (D2). The reasoning is the same for M1.
However, the mechanism M0.5 obtained by applying either M0 or M1 uniformly randomly
doesn’t satisfy (pi, 2−9, 0)-RanDP: the indinguishability property does not hold if D1 or D2 have
all their records set to either 0 or 1, which happens twice as often as either option alone.
Proposition 6. All variants of MPr, AdvPr, and ANPr satisfy both axioms. As a direct corollary,
InfPr also satisfies both axioms.
Proof. We prove it for AdvPr. A mechanism M satisfies (Θ, ε, δ)-AdvPr if for all t ∈ T , θ ∈ Θ,
and S ⊆ O, PD∼θ [t ∈ D | M (D) ∈ S] ≤ eε · PD∼θ [t ∈ D] + δ. We first prove that it satisfies the
convexity axiom. SupposeM is a convex combination ofM1 andM2. Simplifying PD∼θ [. . . ] into
P [. . . ], we have:
P [t ∈ D | M (D) ∈ S] =
P [t ∈ D and M (D) ∈ S and M =M1]
P [M (D) ∈ S] +
P [t ∈ D and M (D) ∈ S and M =M2]
P [M (D) ∈ S]
Denoting Xi = P [M (D) ∈ S and M =Mi] for i ∈ {1, 2}, this gives:
P [t ∈ D | M (D) ∈ S] = X1 · P [t ∈ D | M1 (D) ∈ S]
X1 +X2
X2 · P [t ∈ D | M2 (D) ∈ S]
X1 +X2
≤ X1 (e
ε · P [t ∈ D]) + δ
X1 +X2
+
X2 (e
ε · P [t ∈ D]) + δ
X1 +X2
≤ eε · P [t ∈ D] + δ.
The proof for the post-processing axiom is similar, summing over all possible outputs M (D). It
is straightforward to adapt the proof to all other definitions which change the shape of the prior-
posterior bounds.
Proposition 7. Both versions of CDP satisfy both privacy axioms; where the post-processing axiom
is modified to only allow post-processing with functions computable on a probabilistic polynomial time
Turing machine. As a direct corollary of Proposition 1 for CWPr, CZKPr also satisfies both privacy
axioms.
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Proof. For Ind-CDP and the post-processing axiom, the proof is straightforward: if post-processing
the output could break the ε-indistinguishability property, the attacker could do this on the original
output and break the ε-indistinguishability property of the original definition.
For Ind-CDP and the convexity axiom, without loss of generality, we can assume that the sets
of possible outputs of both mechanisms are disjoint (otherwise, this give strictly less information
to the attacker). The proof is then the same as for the post-processing axiom.
For SimCDP, applying the same post-processing function to the “true” differentially private
mechanism immediately leads to the result, since DP satisfies post-processing. The same reasoning
holds for convexity.
Composition
In this section, if M1 and M2 are two mechanisms, we denote M1+2 the mechanism defined by
M1+2(D) = (M1(D),M2(D)).
Proposition 8 (Existing results). If M1 and M2 are respectively. . .
1. (ε1, δ1)-DP and (ε2, δ2)-DP, then M1+2 is (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-DP [DKM+06].
2. (ε1, δ1)-ProDP and (ε2, δ2)-ProDP, thenM1+2 is (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-ProDP [MKA+08, CO15,
Mei18].
3. (ε1, δa,1, δp,1)-RelDP and (ε2, δa,2, δp,2)-RelDP, thenM1+2 is (ε1 + ε2, δa,1 + δa,2, δp,1 + δp,2)-
RelDP [ZQZ+15].
4. ε1-MIDP and ε2-MIDP, then M1+2 is (ε1 + ε2)-MIDP [CY16].
5. ε1-KLDP and ε2-KLDP, then M1+2 is (ε1 + ε2)-KLDP [BD14, CY16].
6. (α1, ε1)-RenDP and (α2, ε2)-RenDP, then M1+2 is (max (α1, α2) , ε1 + ε2)-RenDP [Mir17].
7. (µ1, τ1)-mCoDP and (µ2, τ2)-mCoDP, then M1+2 is
(
µ1 + µ2,
√
µ12 + µ22
)
-mCoDP [DR16,
BS16].
8. (ξ1, ρ1)-zCoDP and (ξ2, ρ2)-zCoDP, then M1+2 is (ξ1 + ξ2, ξ1 + ξ2)-zCoDP [BS16].
9. (ξ1, ρ1, δ1)-ACoDP and (ξ2, ρ2, δ2)-ACoDP, then M1+2 is (ξ1 + ξ2, ξ1 + ξ2, δ1 + δ2 − δ1δ2)-
ACoDP [BS16].
10. (ξ1, ρ1, ω1)-bCoDP and (ξ2, ρ2, ω2)-bCoDP, thenM1+2 is (ξ1 + ξ2, ξ1 + ξ2,min(ω1, ω2))-bCoDP [BS16].
11. (η1, τ1)-CCoDP and (η2, τ2)-CCoDP, then M1+2 is
(
η1 + η2,
η1+η2
2
2
)
-CCoDP [Col16].
12. f1-DP and f2-DP, than then M1+2 is f1 ⊗ f2-DP [DRS19].
13. (pi, γ1, ε1)-RanDP and (pi, γ2, ε2)-RanDP, then M1+2 is (pi, γ1 + γ2, ε1 + ε2)-RanDP [Hal12].
14. (pi, ε1, δ1)-BayDP
[TF19] and (pi, ε1, δ1)-BayDP
[TF19], thenM1+2 is (pi, ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-BayDP[TF19].
The same result holds for WBDP as an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 in [TF19].
15. (Θ, ε1, γ1, δ1)-TypSt and (Θ, ε2, γ2, δ2)-TypSt, then M1+2 is (Θ, ε1 + ε2, γ1 + γ2, δ1 + δ2)-
TypSt [BF16].
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16. (dD, ε1, δ1)-PsDP and (dD, ε2, δ2)-PsDP thenM1+2 is (dD, ε1+ε2, δ1+δ2)-PsM DP [DNM+13].
17. (P1, ε1, δ1)-BLDP and (P2, ε2, δ2)-BLDP, thenM1 + 2 is (P1+2, ε1 +ε2, δ1 +δ2)-BLDP, where
P1+2 is the concatenation of P1 and P2 (where the randomness is not shared between P1 and
P2, nor between M1 and M2) [LPR20].
Proposition 9. If M1 is d1D-private and M2 is d2D-private, then M1+2 is d1+2D -private, where
d1+2D (D1, D2) = d
1
D (D1, D2) + d
2
D (D1, D2).
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as for ε-DP. M1’s randomness is independent fromM2’s,
so:
P [M1 (D1) = O1 and M2 (D1) = O2] = P [M1 (D1) = O1] · P [M2 (D1) = O2]
≤ ed1D(D1,D2) · P [M2 (D2) = O1] · ed2D(D1,D2) · P [M2 (D2) = O2]
≤ ed1+2D (D1,D2) · P [M1 (D2) = O1 and M2 (D2) = O2] .
Each definition listed in Proposition 8 can also be combined with dD-privacy, and the composi-
tion proofs can be similarly adapted.
Proposition 10. In general, definitions which assume limited background knowledge from the ad-
versary do not compose.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 9 cannot be adapted to a context in which the attacker has limited
background knowledge: as the randomness partially comes from the data-generating distribution,
the two probabilities are no longer independent. A typical example considers two mechanisms which
answer e.g., queries “how many records satisfy property P” and “how many records satisfy property
P and have an ID different from 4217”: the randomness in the data might make each query private,
but the combination of two queries trivially reveals something about a particular user. Variants of
this proof can easily be obtained for all definitions with limited background knowledge.
11 Scope and related work
In this section, we detail our criteria for excluding particular data privacy definitions from our work,
we list some relevant definitions that were excluded by this criteria, and we list related works and
existing surveys in the field of data privacy.
11.1 Methodology
Whether a data privacy definition fits our description is not always obvious, so we use the following
criterion: the attacker’s capabilities must be clearly defined, and the definition must prevent this
attacker from learning about a protected property. Consequently, we do not consider:
• definitions which are a property of the output data and not of the mechanism;
• variants of technical notions that are not data privacy properties, like the different types of
sensitivity;
• definitions whose only difference with DP is in the context and not in the formal property,
like the distinction between local and global models.
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In Section 11.2, we give a list of notions that we found during our survey, and considered to be
out of scope for our work.
To find a comprehensive list of DP notions, besides the definitions we were aware of or were
suggested to us by experts, we conducted a wide literature review using two research datasets:
BASE23 and Google Scholar24. The exact queries were run on June 1st 2020. The corresponding
result count are summarized in Table 4.
Query (BASE) Hits
“differential privacy” relax year:[2000 to *] 130
“differential privacy” variant -relax year:[2000 to *] 115
Query (Google Scholar) Hits
“differential privacy” “new notion” 224
“differential privacy” “new definition” -“new notion” 180
Table 4: Queries for the literature review.
First, we manually reviewed each paper and filtered them out until we had only papers which
either contained a new definition or were applying DP in a new setting. All papers which defined
a variant or extension of DP are cited in this work.
11.2 Out of scope definitions
As detailed in the previous section, we considered certain data privacy definitions to be out of scope
for our work, even when they seem to be related to differential privacy. This section elaborates on
such definitions.
Lack of semantic guarantees
Some definitions do not provide clear semantic privacy guarantees, or are only used as a tool in
order to prove links between existing definitions. As such, we did not include them in our survey.
• ε-privacy, introduced in [MGG09], was a first attempt at formalizing an adversary with re-
stricted background knowledge. Its formulation does not provide a semantic guarantee, and
it was superseded by noiseless privacy [Dua09, BBG+11] (introduced in Section 6).
• Relaxed indistinguishability, introduced in [RHMS09] is a relaxation of adversarial privacy that
provides a plausible deniability by requiring for each tuple, that at least l tuples must exist
with ε-indistinguishability. It does not provide any guarantee against Bayesian adversaries.
• Differential identifiability, introduced in [LC12], bounds the probability that a given indi-
vidual’s information is included in the input datasets but does not measure the change in
23https://www.base-search.net/
24https://scholar.google.com/
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probabilities between the two alternatives. As such, it does not provide any guarantee against
Bayesian adversaries25.
• Crowd-blending privacy, introduced in [GHLP12], combines differential privacy with k-anonymity.
As it is strictly weaker than any mechanism which always returns a k-anonymous dataset,
the guarantees it provides against a Bayesian adversary are unclear. It is mainly used to
show that combining crowd-blending privacy with pre-sampling implies zero-knowledge pri-
vacy [GHLP12, LP15].
• Membership privacy26, introduced in [SDO+19], is tailored to membership inference attacks
on machine learning models; the guarantees it provides are not clear.
• (k, ε)-anonymity, introduced in [HABMA17], first performs k-anonymisation on a subset of
the quasi identifiers and then ε-DP on the remaining quasi-identifiers with different settings for
each equivalence class of the k-anonymous dataset. The semantic guarantees of this definition
are not made explicit.
• Posteriori DP, introduced in [WYZ16], compares two posteriors in a way similar to inferential
privacy, but does not make the prior (and thus, the attacker model) explicit.
• Noiseless privacy27, introduced in [Far19b], limits the change in the number of possible out-
puts when one record in the dataset changes. As it does not bound the change in probabilities
of the mechanism, it does not seem to offer clear guarantees against a Bayesian adversary.
• Weak DP, introduced in [WSMD20], adapts DP for streams, but it only provides a DP
guarantee for the average of all possible mechanism outputs28, rather than for the mechanism
itself. Thus, its semantics guarantees are also unclear.
• Error Preserving Privacy, introduced in [DNGRV18], states that the variance of the adver-
sary’s error when trying to guess a given user’s record doesn’t change significantly after. The
exact adversary model is not specified.
Variants of sensitivity
A important technical tool used when designing differentially private mechanisms is the sensitivity
of the function that we try to compute. There are many variants to the initial concept of global
sensitivity [DMNS06], including local sensitivity [NRS07], smooth sensitivity [NRS07], restricted
sensitivity [BBDS13], empirical sensitivity [CZ13], empirical differential privacy29 30 [ASV13],
recommendation-aware sensitivity [ZLR+13], record and correlated sensitivity [ZXLZ15], depen-
dence sensitivity [LCM16], per-instance sensitivity [Wan17], individual sensitivity [CD20], elastic
sensitivity [JNS18] and derivative sensitivity [LPM18]. We did not consider these notions as these
do not modify the actual definition of differential privacy.
25Differential identifiability was reformulated in [LQS+13] as an instance of membership privacy.
26Another definition with the same name is introduced in [LQS+13], we mention it in Section 7
27Another definition with the same name is introduced in [Dua09, BBG+11], we mention it in Section 6.
28It also assumes that some uncertainty comes from the data itself, similarly to definitions in Section 7
29Even though it is introduced as a variant of DP, it was later shown to be a measure of sensitivity [CH16].
30Another definition with the same name is introduced in [BD19], we mention it in Section 6.
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11.3 Local model and other contexts
In this work we focused on DP variants/extensions typically used in the global model, in which a
central entity has access to the whole dataset. It is also possible to use DP in other contexts, without
formally changing the definition. The main alternative is the local model, where each individual
randomizes their own data before sending it to an aggregator. This model, formally introduced
in [DJW13], is used e.g., by Google [EPK14], Apple [Tea17], or Microsoft [DKY17].
Many definitions we listed were initially presented in the local model, such as dD-privacy [CABP13],
geo-indistinguishability [ABCP13], earth mover’s Pr [FDM19], location Pr [EG16], profile-based
DP [GC19], divergence DP and smooth DP from [BD14], and extended DP, distribution Pr, and
extended distribution Pr from [KM19b].
Below, we list the definitions that are the same as previously listed definitions, but used in a
different attacker setting; the list also includes alternatives to the local and global models.
• In [SCR+11], the authors introduce distributed DP, which corresponds to local DP, with the
additional assumption that only a portion of participants are honest.
• In [KPRU14], the authors define joint DP, to model a game in which each player cannot learn
the data from any other player, but are still allowed to observe the influence of their data
on the mechanism output. In [WHWX16], authors define a slightly different version of this
idea, multiparty DP, in which the view of each subgroup of players is differentially private in
respect to other players inputs.
• In [BEM+17], the authors define DP in the shuffled model, which falls in-between the global
and the local model: the local model is augmented by an anonymous channel that randomly
permutes a set of user-supplied messages, and differential privacy is only required of the output
of the shuffler.
• In [JLT18], the authors define localized information privacy, a local version of information
privacy (mentioned in Section 7).
• In [MK19], the authors define utility-optimized local DP, a local version of one-sided differential
privacy (mentioned in Section 4) which additionally guarantees that if the data is considered
sensitive, then a certain set of outputs is forbidden.
• In [DPZ+18, NYH+18, ABK+19], the authors define personalized local DP, a local version of
personalized DP (mentioned in Section 5).
• In [ACPP18], the authors define dD-local DP, a local version of dD-DP (mentioned in Sec-
tion 5); this was redefined as condensed local DP in [GTT+19].
• In [LKCT19], the authors define task-global DP and task-local DP, which are equivalents of
element-level DP (mentioned in Section 4) in a meta-learning context.
11.4 Related work
The relation between the main syntactic models of anonymity and DP was studied in [CT13], in
which the authors claim that the former is designed for privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP),
while DP is more suitable for privacy preserving data mining (PPDM).
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In [WYZ16], authors establish connections between differential privacy (seen as the additional
disclosure of an individual’s information due to the release of the data), identifiability (seen as the
posteriors of recovering the original data from the released data), and mutual-information privacy
(which measures the average amount of information about the original dataset contained in the
released data).
The appropriate selection of the privacy parameters for DP was also exhaustively studied. This
problem in not trivial, and many factors can be considered: in [HGH+14], the authors used economic
incentives, in [LC11, Kre19, PTB19], the authors looked at individual preferences, and in [LHC+19,
LP19], the authors took into account an adversary’s capability in terms of hypothesis testing and
guessing advantage respectively.
Some of the earliest surveys focusing on DP were written by Dwork [Dwo08, Dwo09], and sum-
marize algorithms achieving DP and applications. The more detailed “privacy book” [DR+14]
presents an in-depth discussion about the fundamentals of DP, techniques for achieving it, and ap-
plications to query-release mechanisms, distributed computations or data streams. Another recent
survey focuses on the release of histograms and synthetic data with DP [NR19].
In [HZNF15], the authors classify different privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) into 7 com-
plementary dimensions. Indistinguishability falls into the Aim dimension, but within this cate-
gory, only k-anonymity and oblivious transfer are considered; differential privacy is not mentioned.
In [AGM18], the authors survey privacy concerns, measurements and privacy-preserving techniques
used in online social networks and recommender systems. They classify privacy into 5 categories;
DP falls into Privacy-preserving models along with e.g., k-anonymity. In [WE18] the authors clas-
sified 80+ privacy metrics into 8 categories based on the output of the privacy mechanism. One
of their classes is Indistinguishability, which contains DP as well as several variants. Some vari-
ants are classified into other categories; for example Re´nyi DP is classified into Uncertainty and
mutual-information DP into Information gain/loss. The authors list 8 differential privacy variants;
our taxonomy can be seen as an extension of the contents of their work (and in particular of the
Indistinguishability category).
Finally, some surveys focus on location privacy. In [MH18], the authors highlight privacy con-
cerns in this context and list mechanisms with formal provable privacy guarantees; they describe
several variants of differential privacy for streaming (e.g., pan-privacy) and location data (e.g., geo-
indistinguishability) along with extensions such as pufferfish and blowfish privacy. In [CEP+17], the
authors analyze different kinds of privacy breaches and compare metrics that have been proposed
to protect location data.
12 Conclusion
We proposed a classification of DP variants and extensions using the concept of dimensions. When
possible, we compared definitions from the same dimension, and we showed that definitions from
the different dimensions can be combined to form new, meaningful definitions. In theory, it means
that even if there were only three possible ways to change a dimension (e.g., making it weaker or
stronger), this would result in 37 = 2187 possible definitions: the ≈ 225 existing definitions shown
in Figure 1 are only scratching the surface of the space of possible notions. Using these dimensions,
we unified and simplified the different notions proposed in the literature. We highlighted their
properties such as composability and whether they satisfy the privacy axioms by either collecting
the existing results or creating new proofs, and whenever possible, we showed their relative relations
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to one another. We hope that this work will make the field of data privacy more organized and
easier to navigate, especially for new practitioners.
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